Eberhard Bohne

EU and US Security Strategies from the Perspective of National and European Identities

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Discussion Papers

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Introduction

The preservation of external and internal security is the prerogative and main task of the modern nation-state under the concept of sovereignty which emerged in Europe from the civil and religious wars since the sixteenth century. The state needs, at least, the diffuse support of its citizens in order to ensure enduring security. A major source of this support is the identification of the people with their nation. Particularly in times of war, governments appeal to national identity and unity when asking their citizens for sacrifices.

In 2002, the Bush Administration published its National Security Strategy (NSS)[1] which the President is required to submit to Congress under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.[2] In 2003, the European Council – the most powerful political institution of the European Union – approved of the European Security Strategy (ESS)[3] which formulates for the first time a common and comprehensive security policy of EU member states. One may wonder whether the US and European security strategies reflect characteristics of national identities, and possibly a transnational European identity in the case of the ESS.

It is common experience that collective identities can influence human behavior. This is why, for instance, companies are advised to cultivate their corporate identities in order to strengthen the loyalty and commitment of their employees. At the national level, the characteristics of national and transnational identities help explain general political perceptions, attitudes and preferences which account for major policy developments.[4] The interpretative and explanatory functions

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1   The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/usc/nss.pdf>.

2   50 U.S.C. 404 a. This obligation was included in the National Security Act of 1947 by section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433-October 1, 1986).

3   A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003 <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

4   *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin*, Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany, in A. Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 287-316, 294.

of national identity can be relevant for the understanding let alone re-solving of international conflicts. These conflicts often derive, at least in part, from competing claims and conceptions of national identity.[5]

This essay will discuss:

– major positions in the ESS and NSS,

– characteristics of national identities in the three largest EU member states[6] – Germany, France, England – and in the US,

– reflections of national identities in the ESS and NSS, and

– implications of national and transnational identities for transatlantic security policies.

EU and US Security Strategy

Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the ESS and NSS us-ing global role, threats, goals and principles, and international and transatlantic relations as criteria of comparison.[7]

Main Contents of ESS

The ESS[8] begins by invoking existing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe which is unprecedented in its history. The global role of the

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5   *A. D. Smith*, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

6   Confining the analysis to France, Germany and England does not suggest that the national identities of other European states are irrelevant for the European Security Strategy. Lack of time and resources are the only explanation for this restriction.

7   See for a detailed comparison of the two security strategies: *E. Bohne*, Die Eu-ropäische Sicherheitsstragie und die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA im Vergleich, in S. Brink and H. A. Wolff (eds.), Gemeinwohl und Verantwortung, Festschrift für Hans Herbert von Arnim zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), p. 43-71; *M. Schröder*, Aktuelle Gefahren der internationalen Gemeinschaft im Spiegel der US-amerikanischen und europäischen Sicher-heitsstrategie, in J. Bröhmer et al. (eds.), Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Georg Ress zum 70. Geburtstag (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 2005), p. 285-293.

8   See for a comprehensive account of the ESS: *S. Biscop*, The European Security Strategy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 15 ff.

Table 1: Comparison of European Security Strategy (ESS) and US National Security Strategy (NSS)[a]

Security Strategy	Global Role	Threats	Goals and Principles	International/ Transatlantic Relations
ESS	-EU is a global player of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's GNP (1) -EU should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world (1)	-International terrorism, proliferation of WMDs and other security threats are neither purely military nor can they be tackled by purely military means (7) -Other security threats include regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, poverty, desease, global warming and competition for natural resources, e.g. water, energy (2-4)	-Strengthening of UN and international institutions (9) - Development of international law and a rule-based international order (9,10) - Preventive engagement by a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military etc. means (7,11) - Transformation of national militaries into more flexible mobile forces (12) - Improved sharing of intelligence, civilian and other national resources (12)	- Multilateralism (9, 10) - Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable (13) - Effective and balanced partnership between EU and US (13)
NSS	-Unprecedented and unequaled strength and influence of the US (1) -Unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity (1) -Building and maintaining military strength beyond challenge (29) -Distinctly American internationalism reflecting the union of American values and national interests (1)	-War against terrorists of global reach which is different from any other war in history (5) -Stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMDs (14) -Other security threats include regional conflicts, drug trafficking in Latin America, and disease war and poverty in Africa (10)	-Best defense is a good offense (6) - US maintains the option of preemptive actions to counter a "sufficient threat" to national security - Other nations should not use preemption as a pretext for aggression (15) - US is prepared to act apart when national interests and unique responsibilities require (31)	-US will organize coalitions which requires consistent consultations among partners "with a spirit of humility" (25) -US "will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe" (25) -EU as trade partner (25) -Defense of "transatlantic alliance" as NATO's core mission but need for new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission (25)

a) Page numbers in brackets

EU is defined in the ESS as "inevitably a global player" who should shoulder his responsibility for global security and building a better world. This role perception is derived from the statistical data that the EU consists of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's GNP.

According to the ESS, the primary threat to European and global security is international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. However, the ESS emphasizes that these threats are not purely military and, therefore, cannot be tackled by only military means. From this political perspective it is not surprising that the ESS also focuses on non-military threats like global warming, water shortages and poverty.

The ESS pursues three strategic goals:

– abatement of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

– creation of a ring of well-led states along the Eastern border of the EU and in the Mediterranean region, in particular a solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict, and

– development of a strong global community, well-functioning international institutions, and the promotion of a norm-based global order.

The main principle of action is prevention. The ESS calls for a mixture of military, intelligence, police, judicial, and other civil means in order to reach the political roots of conflicts and threats. The ESS emphasizes the need to act before countries deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. "Preventive engagement" is the buzz-word used in the ESS to characterize this concept.

In the ESS international cooperation is oriented multilaterally with the UN playing the central role. The ESS recognizes that "the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable," and emphasizes the aim of "an effective and balanced partnership with the USA."

Main Contents of NSS

The NSS begins in the first sentence with an emphasis on the "unprecedented and unequaled strength and influence" of the US in the world. This national self-assurance is the base for claiming "unparal-

leled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity." The words used to define America's role in the world are "to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" and "to help make the world not just safer but better". The NSS characterizes this role as "a distinctly American internationalism" that reflects the union of American values and national interests. The fundamental differences between American and European self-perceptions could not be revealed more vividly than through the NSS' assertion of "a distinctly American internationalism" based on unprecedented and unequaled power while the ESS invokes centuries of internal warfare in Europe which has finally been overcome.

The assessment of present security threats in the NSS is similar but not identical with the assessment in the ESS. According to the NSS, the US "is fighting a war against terrorists". The strategy's main goals are defeating terrorism and promoting an international balance of power that favors freedom. This power balance is guaranteed by US supremacy. In contrast, the ESS is in pursuit of establishing a process much like the Community method in the EU and "a norm-based international order" in which conflicts are solved gradually according to rules, procedures, negotiations and multilateral cooperation involving all related parties in a democratic fashion.

The main principle of action in the NSS is preemption. This concept is fundamentally different from the ESS concept of prevention. Starting from the premise that "offense is the best defense," the NSS justifies preemptive military actions as soon as a "sufficient threat" to national security interests is perceived.

In line with the notion of a distinctly American internationalism, the NSS prefers a regional and bilateral approach to multilateral cooperation as well as mission-oriented ad hoc-coalitions. The NSS ignores the UN, briefly mentions the WTO, and makes casual reference to the EU as a trade power. The NSS views NATO as central to transatlantic relations but new structures and capabilities are held necessary. The ESS strategy goal of a "norm-based international order" is totally absent in the NSS.

Since the perception of security risks and the design of problem solutions are largely based on the collective historical experience of a people and on common goals for the future, the concept of national identity may help to better understand the ESS and NSS, and their relevance for transatlantic relations.

National and European Identities

Social identity is a complex concept. In social identity theory, the concept is defined in terms of an individual's knowledge that he or she belongs to certain groups together with some emotional value or significance to him or her of this group membership.[9] National identity depicts the knowledge of belonging to a nation. Transnational identity is concerned with the collectivity that is larger than a nation. In this context, the collectivity is Europe.

People often hold multiple identities. They may identify with their home country and with Europe. The preamble of the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe[10] explicitly states "that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions, and, united, ever more closely, to forge a common destiny". At times, the concepts of national and transnational identities are ideologically loaded. This is often the case when the concepts are being used in a political context to demarcate a nation from other nations, and to promote or reject the idea of a unified Europe.

There seems to be agreement that the concepts of national and transnational identities are social constructions.[11] They are used by political elites to construct community and feelings of cohesion and holism.[12] The analytical value of the concepts of national and transnational identities is to help discern and partially explain basic trends of political behavior. The causal linkage between behavior and collective

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9   See *M. A. Hogg* and *D. Abrams*, Social Motivation, Self-Esteem and Social Identity, in D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg (eds.), Social Identity Theory (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 29.

10   OJ C 310/1 [2004].

11   *B. Stråth*, Introduction: Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Community, in B. Stråth (ed.), Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community (Brussels: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2000), p. 19-46, 22; and *A. Pagden*, Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent, in A. Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 33-54, 33.

12   *B. Stråth*, A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept, European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2002), p. 387-401, 387.

identities is, according to social identity theory,[13] the need of collective social groups to give meaning to their collective selves.

Concepts of national and European identities define social groups in terms of territorial characteristics, common history and culture, shared values, as well as aspects of statehood and sovereignty.[14] An important element of national and European identities are myths establishing the foundations of a nation's and Europe's own being, and answering questions of who we are and where we come from.[15] Thus, a myth is a set of beliefs held by a community about itself. It is about perceptions rather than historical truth.[16]

The following comparison of national identities focuses on four general criteria which define a nation's political identity: historical inheritance, its perceived role in the world, the legitimacy of governance, and national myths. Table 2 summarizes characteristics of national and European identities.

The French National Identity

The French historian Suzanne Citron has analyzed how the historical inheritance of France is presented in the history books which were used in French public schools until the 1980s. She has shown that official historiography depicts France as an eternal entity which has no beginning but always existed, first under the name of Gaule which was later called France.[17] A historical continuity is constructed from

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13 See: *D. Abrams*, How Do Group Members Regulate Their Behaviour? An Integration of Social Identity and Self-Awareness Theories, in D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg 1990 (fn. 9), p. 89-112, 89; *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin* 2002 (fn. 4), p. 291.

14 *A. D. Smith* 1991 (fn. 5), p. 14; *T. Risse*, A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities, in M. Green Cowles, J. Caporoso and T. Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 198-237, 201.

15 *B. Stråth* 2000 (fn. 11), p. 21.

16 *G. Schöpflin*, The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths, in G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin, Myths and Nationhood (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 19-35, 19.

17 *S. Citron*, Le Mythe National (Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1991), p. 30; *S. Citron*, Der Nationalmythos in Frankreich, in Yves Bizeul (ed.), Politische Mythen und Rituale in Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen: (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), p. 43-57, 48.

Table 2: Characteristics of National and European Identities

Identity	Inheritance	Role in the World	Legitimacy	Myths
France	- Historical continuity from the Franconian King Clovis (481) to present time - Inventors of enlightenment, freedom, equality, brotherhood, democracy	- Grandeur et "mission civilisatrice" - France as capital of Europe (de Gaulle)	- "Mission civilisatrice" - State-centered republicanism	- Eternal France - French exceptionalism (Chirac)
Germany	- Discontinuities between Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, Prussian nation-state, Nazi-regime, and the present Federal Republic - Social market economy	- Reconciliation with Western and Eastern neighbors and building a European Germany	- Basic Law 1949, constitutional patriotism - International law as part of Constitution	- Europe as a substitute for a defeated German nation
England	- Independence from Europe since 1066 - Continuous historical evolution as a liberal democracy since the Magna Charta (1215) (Thatcher)	- Global power due to language, closeness with America, and nuclear deterrent (Thatcher) - To promote liberty, to - Right wrongs, and to demand justice (Thatcher) - England is "with" but not "of" Europe (Churchill)	- Crown and Parliament - National sovereignty	- English insular exceptio-nalism since the Normans
EU	- Continent of humane values, Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, French Revolution, fall of the Berlin Wall (Laeken 2001) - The peoples of Europe are proud of their own national identities, but determined to transcend their ancient divisions and to forge a common destiny (Preamble Draft Constitution)	- To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world (Lisbon 2000) - A power wanting to change the course of world affairs, … seeking to set globalization within a moral framework (Laeken 2001) - A world power which must propound its own values, stand up and be counted as a player in globalization (Commission 2002)	- Human rights, representative democracy, rule of law and social justice as basic elements of European identity (Paris 1973)	- Community method combining the general interest (Commission) and democratic representation through European Parliament and Council (Commission 2001)
USA	- Since the founding fathers, fighting for freedom and democracy, and seeking honor as a nation - -declaration of Independence as universal, enduring, self-evident truths	- Benevolent global hegemony - America goes abroad in search of monsters to destroy - Victory or holocaust in the war on terrorism	- Harmony between fundamental national interests and moral goals - Exemption from international law under certain circumstances	- "A chosen people" called upon by God to be an example and light to the world (John Winthrop) - American exceptionalism as celebrated, for instance, by Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush

the Franconian kings Clovis and Charlesmagne to the present times. In the eyes of French political leaders like de Gaulle, Mitterand, and Chirac, France is the inventor of enlightenment, freedom, equality, brotherhood and democracy.[18]

The French role in the world is defined by "grandeur" and a "mission civilisatrice." In the words of Fernand Braudel,[19] a well-known French historian, France has been the "educator" of America and remains the only "common light for Europe." No surprise that de Gaulle[20] called France the "capital of Europe."

The political legitimacy of French governance is based on this idea of a "mission civilisatrice" combined with traditional republicanism.[21] The myth of an eternal France with a mission of civilizing the world is the core ingredient of French exceptionalism. Originally this perception of national identity was an obstacle to the building of an European Union with supranational institutions. De Gaulle, for instance, rejected the concept of a unified Europe. However, studies show that a Europeanization of French national identity has occurred under de Gaulle's successors, particularly under Mitterand and Chirac.[22] Socialist and conservative elites transformed the French "mission civilisatrice" into a European mission and incorporated, in this way, the idea of European integration into French national identity. As President Chirac put it[23]:

> If France says yes [to the treaty of Maastricht], she can better reaffirm in what I believe: French exceptionalism.

The German National Identity

The construction of German national identity after World War II differs considerably from the national identities of Germany's neighbors.

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18   *T. Risse* 2001 (fn. 14), p. 211-213.

19   *F. Braudel*, Écrits sur l'histoire (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), p. 305.

20   *J. Lacouture*, Citations du président de Gaulle, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), p. 119.

21   *S. Citron* 1991 (fn. 17), p. 25; T. Risse 2001 (fn. 14), p. 211.

22   *T. Risse* 2001 (fn. 14), p. 212; *A. Clark*, François Mitterand and the Idea of Europe, in B. Nelson, D. Roberts and W. Veith (eds.), The Idea of Europe (New York: Berg, 1992), p. 152-174.

23   Le choix de l'Europe, Liberation of 11 September 1992.

There is no consensus on the historical inheritance which defines Germany's post-war national identity. Under Chancellor Adenauer German national identity was reconstructed by a conservative elite a-round the concept of a Christian occident which once was dominated by the medieval Holy Roman Empire of German Nation.[24] After the reunification of Germany, the achievements of the Prussian nation-state have regained acceptance as elements of German identity. The only undisputed historical ingredient of Germany's identity is the post-war success of the social market economy.

Germany's post-war role in the world can best be described with the dictum of Thomas Mann, the German novelist: "We do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany".[25] To achieve this goal Germany pursued the policies of reconciliation with its Western and Eastern neighbors while, at the same time, remaining a reliable part-ner of the transatlantic alliance.

Given the discontinuity of German history, political legitimacy as an element of German post-war national identity is not constructed around a historical mission or glorious past. The only common de-nominator for German identity is the undisputed consensus on the Constitution of 1949. This includes the acceptance of a partial dero-gation of national sovereignty.[26]

The myth in German identity construction is the role of Europe. Studies show that European integration was regarded for decades by German elites as a substitute for their own defeated nation.[27] Unlike French elites who constructed European integration as an element of national identity and national interests, German elites considered Eu-ropean integration as superseding German nationalism.[28] In other words, national identity merged with European identity.

I have the impression that German national identity has been un-dergoing a process of reconstruction since the end of the 1990s. The Europeaness of German national identity is still strong. However, post-war German identity is challenged on two fronts. Germany is, first, in

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24   *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin* 2002 (fn. 4), p. 294.

25   Quoted in *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin* 2002 (fn. 4), p. 206.

26   See: Art. 23-25 of the Federal Constitution.

27   *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin* 2002 (fn. 4), p. 301.

28   *T. Risse* and *D. Engelmann-Martin* 2002 (fn. 4), p. 301.

the process of adapting its concept of a social market economy, a core element of post-war identity construction, to the new global realities. A second front reflects new threats of national security that will require Germany to overhaul its military forces and to abandon post-war military doctrine that German troops do not engage in combat unless in direct self-defense.

Since the EU is deeply divided over a common foreign and security policy, Germany cannot defer the solution of these problems to the European institutions but must define its own national interests. It is my guess that old historical and social conflicts will break out during the process of defining national interests.

The English[29] National Identity

The historical inheritance of England is viewed by traditional historiography[30] and political leaders of the conservative and labor parties alike as a "thousand years" of independence from Europe, with a continuous constitutional development as a free and democratic nation. The former Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell criticized Britain's bid to enter the Common Market in 1962 as "the end of Britain as an inde-

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29 In this section the words "England" and "English" are used synonymously with the words "Britain" and "British", without engaging in the debate on the correct historical and political usage of these words. See for details: *E. Jones*, The English Nation. The Great Myth (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), p. 272, fn. 12.

30 See for instance: *W. S. Churchill*, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol. I – IV (London: Cassell, 1956-1958); *G. M. Trevelyan*, History of England, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1952). Both works hardly account for England's influential role in European culture and politics before the ascent of Henry VIII. A case in point is Churchill's narrative on "the Birth of Britain" (Vol. I, 11th ed., 1967) who mentions St. Boniface (680-755), originally called Winfrith, only in passing (p. 65, 68) despite the fact that St. Boniface christianized vast areas of Central Europe and, thus prepared the ground for the unification of these lands under the rule of Charlemagne, see Jones 1998 (fn. 29), p. 2. With a similar aloofness towards England's role in early European history, Trevelyan (p. 293, 311) observes on Henry VIII's rule that the "balance of power in Europe" first became the object of England's foreign policy …" and "the independence of the country was established in the face of Europe, secular and spiritual". This onesidedness of traditional English historiography is criticized by Jones 1998 (fn. 29), p. 23 f.

pendent nation … the end of a thousand years of history".[31] In a similar vein, former British Prime Minister John Major observed 34 years later, in 1996, that "a thousand years of British history" would be vandalized "by seeking closer integration with Europe".[32] England's role in the world as perceived by its political leaders has best been described by former Prime Minister Thatcher:[33]

> … However much the Europeans huff and puff about a common European foreign and security policy and a common defence, they know perfectly well that Britain as a European power is in a league of her own. Our language, our links through trade and political influence, our outlook, our closeness with America, our nuclear deterrent – all make us a global power, …

The legitimacy of English governance is symbolized by the historical continuity of the Parliament and the Crown. Their sovereignty seems to be threatened by European integration.[34] Unlike French exceptionalism which integrated the concept of an unified Europe into national identity, English exceptionalism has constructed a national identity that is separated from European identity, in Churchill's famous dictum: "We are with them [Europe] but not of them"[35].

England's insular exceptionalism has been called "the great myth" of the English nation by the English historian Edwin Jones. He and other twentieth century historians[36] have shown that the construction of English identity around the concept of a purely indigenous evolution of English history and institutions was originally imposed in the sixteenth century by King Henry VIII after his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and his break with the authority of the Pope.[37] Jones argues

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31 *H. Gaitskell*, The End of a Thousand Years of History, speech at the conference of the Labour Party in Brighton on 3 October 1962, in B. MacArthur (ed.), The Penguin Book of Twentieth-Century Speeches, (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p, 319-321, 321.

32 Quoted in *E. Jones* 1998 (fn. 29), p. 24.

33 *M. Thatcher*, Statecraft (London: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 399.

34 *T. Risse* 2001 (fn. 14), p. 205.

35 Quoted in *M. Thatcher* 2002 (fn. 33), p. 363.

36 See *H. Butterfield*, The Whig Interpretation of History (Bell, 1931).

37 See *E. Jones* 1998 (fn. 29), p. 18 f.

that England was linked with the European continent in terms of religion, language and culture from the second century up to the sixteenth century when King Henry VIII separated England from Europe. As this separation coincided with the development of England into a world power, English exceptionalism became popular, not least due to official historiography by the Whig historians in the nineteenth century.[38] English insular exceptionalism is today the base for the construction of an English national identity that rejects the further integration of Europe.

Towards a European Identity

Europe is a region and an idea. There seems to be general agreement on the existence or, at least, the possible emergence of a European cultural identity.[39] However, the possibility and even desirability of European political identity is subject to a profound controversy.[40] A consensus exists that a possible European political identity will not replace national identities but complement them. A case in point is the coexistence of national and ethnic or regional identities in several European countries like Spain, Germany, or the United Kingdom.

The main sources for the construction of a European political identity are the European institutions. As early as 1973, the Paris summit of EU member states issued a declaration on European identity[41] which described the basic elements of European identity that were acceptable to the Head of States at that time. The declaration essentially pointed to principles which provide legitimacy to governance such as human rights and the principles of representative democracy, rule of law and social justice.

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38 See the popular and influential presentation of English history: The History of England from the Accession of James II (5 vols., 1848-1861) by T. B. Macaulay who was a liberal Whig MP. His work gave rise to the term "whig history".

39 *A. D. Smith* 1991 (fn. 5), p. 171; *S. Puntscher Riekmann*, The Myth of European Unity, in G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin 1997 (fn. 16), p. 60-71, 65.

40 *A. Smith*, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 143 f.; and *A. Pagden* 2002 (fn. 11), p. 33, 54.

41 Bulletin of the EU 12-1973, p. 131-134.

As for the historical inheritance of the EU, the Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union issued by the European Council[42] in 2001 portrays Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French revolution and the fall of the Berlin wall. Europe's role in the world could not have been defined more ambitiously than in 2000 by the European Council at Lisbon.[43] The Council set the goal for the EU "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world." The European Council at Laeken and the European Commission[44] in 2002 claimed the role of a world power for the EU "wanting to change the course of world affairs" and to stand up for its own values in globalization.

The great myth of European identity construction by the European institutions is the so-called Community method. The Community method consists of patient and, at times, lengthy and cumbersome negotiations among all parties involved, aiming at solutions that ensure the fair treatment of all EU member states, from the largest to the smallest. According to the European Commission,[45] the Community method provides:

> … a means to arbitrate between different interests by passing through two successive filters: the general interest at the level of the Commission and democratic representation, European and national, at the level of the Council and European Parliament, together the Union's legislature.

American[46] and European[47] students of the EU have proposed to apply this method to the solution of global problems. It is my impression

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42 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex 1.
    <http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm>.

43 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, see internet address in fn. 42.

44 European Commission, A Project for the European Union, Communication of 22 May 2002, COM (2002) 245 final, p. 3, 11.

45 European Commission, European Governance. A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 8.

46 *R. O. Keohane*, Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States, Journal of Common Market Studies, November, 2002.

that the intense political and economic interdependence between EU member states rather than the Community method has so far guaranteed the gradual solution of European problems. Consequently, I have some doubts that this method will work outside the European cultural and institutional setting.

The vision of the EU as a world power constructed by the EU institutions and political parties at the EU level seems to be wishful thinking as long as there is no common foreign and defense policy. After the rejection of the draft Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands in 2005 Europe's role as a world power as well as the emergence of a European identity in EU member states appear to be, at first glance, even more remote than ever. At second glance, though, the negative Dutch and French votes were a rejection of present national policies, particularly in the social sector, rather than a rejection of the idea of Europe. It is a frequent practice by the electorates of EU member states to use European elections and referenda to express their protest against domestic policies.

There are two events which support the thesis of the emergence of a European identity. First is the introduction of the Euro in 2002 which would have been politically impossible if there had not been a generally positive attitude towards European integration among most national elites and the public. In the meantime, the Euro has become a symbol of European integration in the daily lives of the citizens.[48] The British and Scandinavian refusal to join the Euro zone reflects the limitations and political fragility of the European quest for integration. However, the Euro has been a successful experiment so far in spite of the widespread prophecy of doom at the start. The second event indicating the emergence of a European identity was the European-wide public protest against the US/British attack on Iraq. Millions of people took to the streets in London, Paris, Rome, Madrid and Berlin. Americans often misunderstand these and similar protests against wars as signs of pacifist weakness[49] or anti-Americanism. The truth, however,

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47 *P. N. Rasmussen*, Europe and a New Global Order, A report for the Party of European Socialists, May 2003 < http://www.pes.org/upload/Publications/ 74ENPES%20Rasmussen_28_05_2003.pdf>.

48 See *T. Risse*, The Euro Between National and European Identity, Journal of European Public Policy 10, 2003, p. 487-505, 495.

49 See *R. Kagan*, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage, 2004).

is that the core element of European identity is the collective experience of centuries of wars which has generated a consensus among the peoples of Europe that wars of aggression[50] are unacceptable as political means. Most people in Europe suspected in 2003 that Iraq did not pose a military or terrorist threat to the US and the UK. The correctness of the earlier suspicion is today beyond dispute.

The vision of the EU as a global power promoting peace and prosperity in the world is still a dream of the future held by EU institutions and certain elites in EU member states. It may help forge a European identity. However, talk of a "European dream" that is quietly eclipsing the American dream – as the American social scientist Jeremy Rifkin[51] put it – is premature.

The US National Identity from a Neo-Conservative Perspective

The presently dominant construction of US national identity is the neo-conservative perspective. The political relevance of the neo-conservative ideology tends to be underestimated by European observers. They often regard the positions and strident language of neo-conservative politicians as some sort of American political folklore. However, the writings of neo-conservative authors like Kagan, Kristol, Wolfowitz, Perle, Frum and others read, at times, like policy scripts for the implementation of current US foreign and security policies. The main characteristics of the neo-conservative identity construction are presented in Table 2.

At the core of US national inheritance is the heroic age of the Founding Fathers, the American revolution and the Declaration of Independence.[52] Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan are portrayed

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50　The Federal Administrative High Court of Germany has found in a carefully reasoned Judgment of 21 June 2005 (BVerwG 2 WD 12.04) that the US and UK attack has violated international law. The Court fully rehabilitated an officer of the German Army who had refused to carry out a software project which could be used in the context of military actions against Iraq, and who was, therefore, demoted from major to captain
<http://www.bverwg.de/media/archive/3059.pdf>.

51　*J. Rifkin*, The European Dream. How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (New York: Penguin, 2004).

52　*Smith* (fn. 14), p. 150; and *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan*, Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility, in R. Kagan and W. Kristol (eds.), Present Dangers (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 22-24.

by neo-conservative writers as the presidents who best represented American heroism in the past.[53] The Declaration of Independence is not merely a historical and political document but lays down "universal, enduring, and 'self-evident' truths".[54] As Kristol and Kagan emphasize: "that has been … the main point of the conservatives' war against a relativistic multiculturalism".[55] America's role in the world should be:[56]

> … benevolent global hegemony. Having defeated the "evil empire" the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. The first objective of US foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance …

This claim to global supremacy is not new in American foreign policy. Theodore Roosevelt was the US President who first and most bluntly championed this idea, because he firmly believed – as Beale[57] put it – that the spread of English-speaking people meant attainment of world peace and the spread of civilization. "Peace cannot be had", Roosevelt[58] declared, "until the civilized nations have expanded in some shape over the barbarous nations". Thus, he saw it as a duty that "the American flag brings civilization into the waste places of the earth".[59] The parallel between Roosevelt's spread of civilization and the neo-conservatives' spread of US democracy can hardly be overlooked. It escaped Roosevelt then[60] as it escapes the neo-conservatives today that "barbarous nations" have their own culture, traditions, values and national pride which make them reject US enforced democracy. In any event, democratic administrations have also claimed global supremacy

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53 *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan*, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, 1996, 75 (4), pp. 18-32.

54 *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), p. 31.

55 *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), ibid.

56 *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), p. 20.

57 *H. K. Beale*, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), p. 32.

58 Quoted in *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 32.

59 Quoted in *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 70.

60 *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 44.

for the USA[61] although lacking the clarity and fundamental rigor of the neo-conservatives. The main difference between earlier and current expressions of US supremacy lies in the lowered threshold towards military interventions. This distinction is most evident when recalling former President John Quincy Adam's frequently cited word of caution that remained a guiding principle in American foreign policy until the end of the twentieth century. He said:[62] "America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy."

Neo-conservatives[63] view this appeal as obsolete and have responded:

> But why not? The alternative is to have monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts' content, as Americans stand by and watch. What may have been wise council in 1823, when America was a small, isolated power in a world of European giants, is no longer so, when America is the giant.

One can certainly question the wisdom of rejecting John Quincy Adam's advice. In any event, American students[64] of US foreign policy have called the new course the "Bush-Revolution". And like in any revolution, there is no middle way. The characterization of America's current role fighting terrorism in the world by two former high-ranking government officials is: "It is victory or holocaust." [65]

The legitimacy of American governance, has, in part, a metaphysical base. It is not only derived from the Constitution but also from God. This becomes apparent in the pledge of allegiance and the frequent invocations of God by political leaders. Consequently, funda-

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61 *Z. Brzezinski*, Die einzige Weltmacht, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 2001), p. 44, and the National Security Strategy 1998 of the Clinton Administration
    <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1098.pdf>.

62 Quoted in *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), p. 31.

63 *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), p. 31.

64 *I. H. Daalder* and *J. M. Lindsay*, America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), p. 13.

65 *R. Perle* and *D. Frum*, An End to Evil (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 9.

mental national interests are equated with moral goals by neo-conservatives.[66]

The identification of morality with national interests stands in the tradition of Roosevelt's imperialist foreign policies.[67] Moreover, Roosevelt and the neo-conservatives are very pragmatic when it comes to applying the same normative standards to third parties and to their own political behavior. Roosevelt[68] realized that putting down savagery and barbarism "meant occasional injustice". While he urged to "instantly condemn and rectify such wrong when it occurs", he considered occasional injustice acceptable for the sake of civilization and declared: "But shame, thrice shame to us, if we are so foolish as to make such occasional wrong-doing an excuse for failing to perform a great and righteous task." Neo-conservatives even go a step further by claiming the right to act outside international law, as Kagan[69] put it:

> The United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world. … It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively. … It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard.

The myth of US national identity[70] is the belief to be "a chosen people" called upon by God, "a City upon the Hill" – in the famous words by John Winthrop (1630), the spiritual leader of the Pilgrim Fathers. This religiously based American exceptionalism has become a powerful factor[71] in American politics since the neo-conservatives and Evangelicals or born-again Christians joined forces during the Bush II presidency. While there is a debate whether the Christian right is a conquering force in American politics or a faction exploited by the Republican Party[72], fact is that Evangelical voters have been crucial for

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66   *W. Kristol* and *R. Kagan* 1996 (fn. 53), p. 27.

67   *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 26.

68   Quoted in *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 34.

69   See *R. Kagan* 2004 (fn. 49), p. 99.

70   See *J. Rifkin* 2004 (fn. 51), p. 17 f.

71   See *B. Victor*, The Last Crusade (London: Constable, 2005).

72   See *C. Wilcox*, The Christian Right in American Politics: Conquering Force or Exploited Faction?, in Understanding the "God Gap": Religion, Politics, and Policy in the United States and Germany, American Institute for Contemporary

the election of President Bush in 2000 and 2004. The religious myth of neo-conservative presidential power is aptly described on the dust jacket of a DVD on President Bush:[73]

> Nobody spends more time on his knees than George W. Bush. The Bush administration hums to the sound of prayer. Prayer meetings take place day and night. It's not uncommon to see White House functionaries hurrying down corridors carrying Bibles.

The combination of a mission to better the world, military power and metaphysical legitimation has characterized the self-perceptions of imperial powers throughout history. Since neo-conservatives like to view Americans as descendents from Mars and Europeans from Venus[74], the irony should be mentioned that Venus was actually the mother of the Roman Empire according to Graeco-Roman mythology. In this context, the classic formulation of imperialism was provided by Vergil (70 – 19 B.C.) in his monumental epic Aeneid on the empire of the old Romans who were descendents from Aeneas, the son of Venus. When Aeneas was visiting his father Anchises in the Hades, he received the prophecy of Rome's future mission to rule the peoples of the world, impose a peace order and defeat its enemies. This mission is echoed in Wolfowitz' characterization of American leadership 2000 years later (see Table 3).

Liberal construction of US identity rejects the notion of US imperialism and the comparison to the Roman empire, since US military bases around the globe exist with the consent of the host countries.[75] If the US is an empire it is an "empire by invitation". Consequently, liberal US identity construction views Theodore Roosevelt's and other versions of US imperialism as the creed of a frustrated minority which has largely been "extruded in one way or another from the mainstream of American life".[76] Well, this has changed for the time being.

German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, German-American Issues 04, 2005, p. 16-21.

73   *George W. Bush*: Faith in the White House, Good Times DVD 2004.

74   *R. Kagan* 2004 (fn. 49), p. 3.

75   See: *A. M. Schlesinger*, The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p. 161.

76   *A. M. Schlesinger* 1986 (fn. 75), p. 152.

Table 3: Imperial Myths of Roman and American Identities

Vergil on the Roman Empire[a]
Your task, Roman, and do not forget it, will be – to govern the peoples of the world in your empire – these will be your arts – and – to impose a settled pattern upon peace, – to pardon the defeated and war down the proud.
Wolfowitz on American Leadership[b]
US leadership consists of demonstrating that – your friends will be protected and taken care of, – your enemies will be punished, and – those who refuse to support you will regret not having done so.

a) Aeneid, 6th book, Verses 851-853, translated by David West, The Aeneid, rev. Edition, 2003.
b) Statesmanship in the new century, 2000, p. 323.

Reflections on National Identities and Security Strategies

National Identities in the ESS and NSS

At the surface, the ESS reflects a European identity as constructed by the EU institutions. Europe is perceived as a global player with global responsibilities. However, a closer look at the ESS reveals elements of French, German, and English national identities in the security strategy which could make it difficult to effectively implement the ESS. One should recall that the reconstruction of French national identity under General de Gaulle's successors included the transformation of the French "mission civilisatrice" into a European mission in order to better reaffirm, according to Chirac, French exceptionalism. From this starting point, one may interpret the quasi-missionary drive of the ESS to bettering the world and developing "a stronger international society" as a reflection of the Europeanized French identity. This implies, of course, French leadership.

German post-war national identity is constructed around the Constitution of 1949, the willingness to transfer sovereignty rights to international institutions, and the desire to ultimately merge with the transnational collectivity of Europe. Therefore, the emphasis of the ESS on establishing "a rule-based international order" is in line with German identity construction.

For English national identity an integrated Europe remains alien. The English see themselves as being "with" but not "of" Europe. And yet they have agreed on the ESS. English national identity is reflected in the ESS where it addresses issues of implementation. The ESS makes it clear that the achievement of European security objectives requires, for instance:[77]

− the transformation of "our militaries" into more flexible, mobile forces,

− the systematic use of "pooled and shared assets",

− improved sharing of intelligence among member states, and

− stronger diplomatic capability that combines the resources of member states with those of EU institutions.

It should be clear from this list that almost all resources necessary for the implementation of ESS objectives come from EU member states and will ultimately remain under national control. The ESS does not elaborate on supra-national security structures. Geoffrey Hoon, the British Secretary of State for Defense, has made it absolutely clear: "There will be no European army".[78] Consequently, England could consent to the adoption of the ESS in the European Council without altering its aloofness towards an integrated Europe.

The NSS clearly reflects the construction of American identity by the neo-conservative elite. In the US, the reactions span from enthusiastic agreement,[79] to respect despite a difference of opinion,[80] to attempts to downplay it,[81] and even to cool rejection.[82] The NSS is

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77 See: ESS (fn. 3), p. 12.

78 *G. Hoon*, EU Defence or NATO: Must Britain Choose?, speech at the CER fringe meeting at the Labour Party conference on 28 September 2004 <http://222.cer.org.uk/articles/speech_hoon28sep04.html>.

79 *J. L. Gaddis*, A Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy, November/December, 2002, pp. 50-57.

80 *I. H. Daalder* and *J.M. Lindsay* 2003 (fn. 64), p. 125, 195.

81 *T. N. Nichols*, How Really New is the New Bush National Security Strategy?, History News Network, October 14, 2002 <http://hnn.us/articles/printfriendly/1031.html>.

82 *R. Jervis*, Understanding the Bush Doctrine, Political Science Quarterly 188, 2003, pp. 365-388; *G. Soros*, The Bubble of American Supremacy (New York: Public Affairs, 2003).

based on the notion of American exceptionalism called "distinctly A-merican internationalism" in the NSS. National interests and moral norms are equated. The US will maintain military supremacy beyond challenge, and claim the exclusive right to pre-emptive action to counter "sufficient threats." In the NSS, power is almost exclusively conceived in terms of military strength. The fight against terrorism is called "a war". From a political perspective, the inflationary use of the term "war" leads to the self-delusion that the use of military measures is foremost in the fight against terror. In reality, however, terrorist networks cannot be deactivated by employing tanks, missiles, or aircraft carriers. Improving intelligence and hiring more people who understand the culture and language of countries where terrorists come from might yield better results. The so-called war on terrorism is, for the most part, a police mission. Furthermore, the military perspective on security overlooks the fact that American global power not only rests on military and economic resources, but more on instruments of so-called "soft power."[83] Examples of these instruments include the universality of the English language, the exceptional nature of American scholarship, film, popular music, and the general application of information and communication technology. "Soft power" admittedly works indirectly and requires voluntary behavior on the part of the addressees. In the context of international relations, "soft power" presupposes the reliable and cooperative interaction between states. US critics of the neo-conservative security policy warn that the neo-conservative talk of hegemony, unilateralism, and national pride destroys the sources of American "soft power"[84].

Finally, the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes stands in contradiction to international law. Preemptive actions are justified under international law only under three conditions:

− if approved of by the UN Security Council (Art. 42 UN Charter), or

− if there is an "imminent threat" or a "clear and present danger" to national security, and the need for self-defense (Art. 51 UN Charter), or

− if a state is massively abusing the human rights of its citizens, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia (provided that one accepts the controversial doctrine of "humanitarian intervention").

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83   *J. S. Nye*, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 8 ff.

84   See: *J.S. Nye* 2002 (fn. 83), p. 137 ff.

The NSS concept of preemptive action in itself is a threat to international security and a violation of international law.[85] The application of this concept cannot remain a prerogative of the US as implicitly demanded in the NSS. Other states will claim the same rights. Moreover, this concept enhances the risk that rogue states may acquire weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it encourages the expansion of politically fanatic terrorist groups.

The US national identity construction expressed in the NSS is clearly incompatible with European multilateralism which is a core element of the ESS and the national identities of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is hard to see how the Transatlantic Alliance, in particular NATO, can be sustained in the long run if neo-conservative imperialism continues to determine US foreign and security policies. American critics of the NSS argue that the neo-conservative doctrine is not sustainable as a national security strategy. This is because[86] the strategy will lack, in the long run,

- popular domestic support due to the pluralistic nature of American politics, and

- the intelligence and information necessary for carrying out preemptive strikes.

Since neo-conservatives regard Theodore Roosevelt's imperialism as the role model for current US foreign and security policies, one should take note of the fact that Roosevelt failed in his most important objectives to create a stable world and to bring civilization to colonial peoples.[87] In his contemptuous attitude towards "non-civilized" peoples he failed to understand that military and economic power alone is unsuitable for spreading Western political order and values. Neo-conservative doctrine suffers from the same shortcomings.

NATO in Search of a Common Purpose

The incompatibility of European and neo-conservative US identity construction raises the question how NATO, the institutional foundation of

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85 See *S. Biscop* 2005 (fn. 8), p. 59; M. Schröder 2005 (fn. 7), p. 290.

86 See: *R. Jervis*, Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot be Sustained, Political Science Quarterly 120, 2005, pp. 351-377, 356, 365.

87 See *H. K. Beale* 1956 (fn. 57), p. 456 ff.

European security and the Transatlantic Alliance, is sustainable in the long run. Both the ESS and NSS fail to define NATO's new role after the original purpose of the alliance, the common defense against the Soviet empire, has vanished. The ESS only observes that NATO is an "important expression" of the transatlantic relationship and "irreplaceable".[88] The NSS asserts that "NATO's core mission – collective defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies – remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances".[89] While there is a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that NATO's European members should improve their military capabilities[90], it is not at all clear what "collective defense" means after the demise of the USSR.

NATO reform efforts focus on institutional and technical issues, in particular on how to increase European military autonomy and capabilities without de-coupling European security policies and forces from NATO control. The vehicle for these efforts are the "European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)" within NATO and the creation of a "European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)" within the EU.[91] The ESDP aims at establishing a "European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF)" of some 60,000 soldiers with access to NATO's infrastructure and under the command of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) who is alternately a British or German officer. The ERRF will not be a standing army but will consist of pre-designated national forces to be brought together when necessary.[92] The ERRF is not yet operational. Many problems remain unsolved like the command structure or the conditions under which the ERRF would have

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88　See ESS (fn. 3), p. 9, 13.

89　See NSS (fn. 1), p. 25.

90　See *D. S. Yost*, The US-European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP, in J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler (eds.), Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. 81-105.

91　See *J. Howorth* and *J. T. S. Keeler*, The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, in J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler 2003 (fn. 90), pp. 3-21; *J. Howorth*, Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance, in J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler 2003 (fn. 90), pp. 219-238.

92　See *T. Terriff*, The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy, in J. Howorth and J. T. S. Keeler 2003 (fn. 90), pp. 39-59, 46.

access to NATO capabilities.[93] The US will grant access only on a case-by-case basis but not automatically. These and other problems of NATO reform ultimately result from the fact that there is no consensus among NATO allies on the new political and military purpose of the alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is not the place to further discuss details of NATO reform. The concluding remarks rather focus on how national identities might influence the inevitable realignment of the alliance's security strategies.

Realignment of Security Strategies

The original security deal between NATO allies basically consisted in

- the US defending itself and European allies through providing nuclear and conventional deterrence of the USSR in exchange for

- European allies providing the battleground and land armies for the defense of their own and, indirectly, US territories in case of a Soviet attack.

This security equation no longer exists and has not been replaced by a new formula. A new calibration of European and US security interests is likely to be influenced by national identity constructions. In light of US military supremacy some neo-conservatives defiantly ask: "Who needs allies?"[94] They believe that Europe is militarily irrelevant for US security. This assessment is seriously flawed. The following thought experiment indicates that the alliance with Europe is a precondition for US global power and security.

Imagine the US had no bases in Europe, no sophisticated military infrastructure, and were confronted with a weak but hostile "old Europe" and a, maybe, friendly "new Europe" which is squeezed between "old Europe" and a hostile Russia and Belarus and which has an insecure South-Eastern flank towards Caucasian countries under Muslim domination. The Mediterranean sea is largely under Arab control because the US lost their naval bases in this region. Europe has regressed into a political situation comparable to the 17th century after its last universal order under the Habsburg Emperor Charles V had collapsed. This or a similar situation would be the possible long term

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93   See *T. Terriff* 2003 (fn. 92), p. 47.

94   *C. Krauthammer*, Who Needs Allies?, Time Magazine of 26 January 2004.

consequence if the US Government were to follow the neo-conservative strategy of "cherry picking" in Europe.[95] This strategy is known since Roman times as the principle of "divide and rule". The strategy calls for dividing Europe into ad hoc-coalitions of the willing on a case-by-case basis. A likely consequence of this approach is Europe's gradual disintegration.

It is hard to see how the US could sustain a viable political and military role in the Middle East, South-Eastern Europe and in the Caucasian region under these conditions. The loss of a united Europe as a power base would certainly have repercussions on US influence in other regions of the world like Latin America or Asia. A 2004 report by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), a government body providing the President with foreign policy and security analyses, projects five global scenarios for 2020 all of which ignore the possibility of the US losing its European power base.[96] However, it is wishful thinking to assume that NATO's and US military infrastructure in Europe will remain intact under the auspices of the neo-conservative security doctrine. One should add this aspect to Jervis' list of reasons why the NSS is not sustainable.[97] If the US is to maintain its global political and military power, which has been a key element of US national identity since World War II, the US should heed President Kennedy's warning in the historic Paulskirche at Frankfurt in 1963 that complacency and disunity of allies will lead to the disintegration of the Transatlantic Alliance.[98] Kennedy's warning points up that multilateralism rather than unilateral cherry picking in Europe constitutes the basis for the political and military power of the Alliance – and the US.

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95   See: *J.C. Hulsman*, Cherry Picking in Europe: US and European Relationship, statement before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, 11 June 2003
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/tst061103.cfm>.

96   See: NIC, Mapping the Global Future, Washington D.C., December 2004. The scenarios are called "Davos World" (robust economic growth led by China and India), Pax Americana" (US predominance fashioning a new and inclusive global order), "new Caliphate" (a global movement fueled by radical Islamic identity politics) "Cycle of Fear" (large-scale intrusive security measures taken to prevent terrorist attacks but introducing an Orwellian world).

97   See fn. 86.

98   *J. F. Kennedy*, A New Social Order, 24 June 1963
<http://www.fortunecity.com/campus/bates/1300/Speeches/paulsk.htm>.

Autonomy over regional security and multilateralism are core ingredients of European as well as French, German and English national identities. Thus, a new security equation for Europe could be based on

– the US providing defense of European allies against nuclear, supra-regional and other major attacks to be defined, and guaranteeing the allies access to commonly used military capabilities in exchange for

– European allies guaranteeing the US access to military bases and providing the military infrastructure primarily used for ensuring regional security.

At the moment, European countries do not have the capabilities for solving regional conflicts on their own. However, providing the necessary resources for managing regional European security is the price to be paid for European autonomy in security matters. This security equation is, in part, contrary to prevailing national identity constructions. With the gradual increase of European autonomy in security matters, US and NATO control over regional security matters would decrease in the long run. Neo-conservatives view such a development as a threat to US hegemony in Europe. England's traditional role of being "with" but not "of" Europe would have to be changed in order to ensure an autonomous European defense system. A more integrative English role in EU foreign and security policies may emerge once England has realized that it gained nothing from the Iraq adventure but lost trust and influence in Europe. Finally, France and Germany have to take the security interests of East European countries as seriously as their own. It may be the irony of neo-conservative unilateral and hegemonic security policies that they ultimately force the EU to establish an autonomous European foreign and security policy.

The criterion for appraising the suggested realignment of US and European security strategies should be the recognition that the peoples, values and interests of the US and Europe represent a minority in the world. Their protection, therefore, requires common actions and a Transatlantic Alliance based on equal partnership. Put shortly: the US and Europe flourish or perish together.