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Nationale Verwaltungen sind auf unterschiedliche Weise in europäische Regelungsstrukturen in Form von Netzwerken, Ausschüssen und Agenturen eingebunden, die ihnen neue Handlungs- und Gestaltungsspielräume eröffnen. Dieses Phänomen ist keinesfalls neu, stellt es doch seit langem u.a. im Rahmen der Arbeit der Europäischen Kommission eine wichtige Quelle von Expertise dar (Christiansen/Piattoni 2003). Grundsätzlich scheinen insbesondere informelle Abstimmungsformen eher an Bedeutung zu gewinnen denn zu verlieren; obgleich extensive empirische Befunde hierzu rar sind, scheint ein gestiegener Bedarf gerade an informeller Abstimmung aufgrund einer zunehmenden Quantität und Komplexität von Regeln, jedoch auch nach wie vor bestehender Regelungslücken plausibel.
Entstehende Strukturen oder Arenen spielen eine zentrale Rolle u.a. im Agenda-Setting, bei der Vorbereitung von Rechtsakten oder der Abstimmung von gemeinsamen Auslegungshinweisen, Leitfäden und Umsetzungsstrategien. Dabei verbinden sie die nationale mit der EU-Ebene. “They play a crucial role in the daily operation of the European Union (EU) system of governance by providing expertise in policy development and decision-making, by linking Member-States’ governments and administrations with the EU level as well as by increasing the acceptance of European laws and programs in the member-states. EU committees are important arenas for EU governance as well as melting pots of national and supranational government systems” (Egeberg/Schaefer/Trondal 2003:4). Damit stellen sie eine zunehmend häufige Form von Governance dar, welche zentrale Felder nationaler Interessen berührt und oftmals eher transgovernemental aufgebaut ist (zu globalen transnationalen Netzwerken Slaughter 1997). Eine Reihe von Studien im Bereich neuer Governancemechanismen zeigt auf, dass die Zunahme von weichen Koordinierungs-mechanismen, von denen eine Reihe in informellen Arenen angesiedelt ist, empirisch beobachtbare Realität ist, und sucht darüber hinaus zu bestimmen, in wie fern diese informellen, nicht-bindenden Arrangements die Entstehung von Politiken und Entscheidungen erklären können, etwa im Bereich von Forschung zum „Trialog“ (Puetter 2012a). Hier ergeben sich erhebliche Rückwirkungen auch auf die nationale Ebene.
Insofern ist es für die Mitgliedstaaten von besonderer Relevanz, sich frühzeitig in diese Strukturen einzubringen, um sich Handlungsspielräume bei der Umsetzung zu erhalten oder neue zu schaffen sowie Agenden und Rechtsetzungsverfahren in einem frühzeitigen Stadium in bestimmte Richtungen zu lenken, bevor sie den Rat der europäischen Union erreichen.
Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit diesem Phänomen und fokussiert dabei informelle Arenen. Kernthese ist, dass die europäische Integration und ihre Strukturen informelle Arenen befördern, indem sie einerseits mehr Raum, andererseits aber auch mehr Notwendigkeiten generiert. Diskutiert werden sollen neben den Merkmalen der Informalität insbesondere diejenigen Rahmenbedingungen der EU, welche Informalität begünstigen oder erzwingen. Anschließend wird eine Typologie der Informalität auf Ebene der EU skizziert, welche Ansätze zu einer weiteren insbesondere auch empirischen Forschungsagenda eröffnen kann, einerseits mit Blick auf eine detaillierte quantitative und qualitative Erfassung dieser informellen Arenen, andererseits bezüglich der Rolle der Mitgliedsstaaten in ihnen.
Energiepolitik kann in allen modernen Volkswirtschaften als eines der Schlüsselpolitikfelder angesehen werden. Sie stellt inzwischen eine Querschnittsaufgabe dar, welche verschiedene andere Politikfelder berührt, insbesondere Umwelt- und Klimapolitik, Sozialpolitik, Wettbewerbspolitik und Industriepolitik, und darüber hinaus etwa sicherheits- und außenpolitische Aspekte aufweist. Der Begriff der Energiepolitik als Teil der Wirtschaftspolitik umfasst im engeren Sinne Aktivitäten von Gebietskörperschaften aller Ebenen, Parteien oder inter- bzw. supranationaler Institutionen zur Regelung des Systems der Aufbringung, Umwandlung, Verteilung und Verwendung von Energie.
Unterschieden werden müssen jedoch auch hier die prozessualen (politics) sowie inhaltlichen Aspekte (policy) der Energiepolitik. Im weiteren Sinne, als Governance des Energiesektors verstanden, können alle institu-tionellen Rahmenbedingungen, Prozesse und Aktionen, welche auf die Herstellung gesellschaftlich verbindlicher Entscheidungen über Struktur- und Prozessgestaltung in der Her- und Bereitstellung, Verteilung und sowie der Planung und Lenkung des Verbrauchs von Energie zielen unter Energiepolitik subsumiert werden. Aus diesen Rahmenbedingungen folgt in modernen Demokratien in der Regel ein System oftmals schrittweise vor-genommener Politikanpassungen (Inkrementalismus) in der Energiepolitik. Mit Blick auf Deutschland und andere Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union bedeutet dies eine weitgehende Einbettung des nationalen Politikfeldes in europäische Rahmenbedingungen sowie die Berücksichtigung entsprechender Wechselwirkungen horizontal wie auch vertikal.
Introduction
(2018)
EU administrative law scholarship and practice remain confused about the reach and interrelation of arts 290 and 291 TFEU, which created the categories of delegated and implementing Commission acts. The introduction of these two different instruments of executive rule-making by the Lisbon Treaty has prompted attempts in delineating them, based on constitutional theories of separation of powers or functional differentiation. These attempts have failed to a large extent, all the more since the CJEU’s relevant case law has not been helpful in constructing a proper distinction. Today, recourse to arts 290 and 291 TFEU by the legislator takes place in the tension created between the fact that the Treaties, informed by an abstract constitutional distinction between legislation and execution, appear to have created categorically different acts, and the fact that delegated and implementing rule-making procedures in practice have become increasingly similar to each other. In simplified terms, the problem is that delegated and implementing acts appear – in terms of their foundation in primary law – as fundamentally different acts that are, however, adopted in practice through similar procedures, at the same time as their content and legal effects are indistinguishable in many or even in most cases. Yet, if we accept that the creation of two forms of Commission acts was prompted by some form of legal necessity or legitimate political will, then understanding the difference between delegating and implementing acts remains paramount.
Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU are notoriously hard to differentiate. However, there is some evidence that a separation on the basis of substantive regulation through delegated acts and procedural specifications by implementing acts is forthcoming. The substantive – procedural differentiation is not very clear cut, but it affords the institutions flexibility in answering new challenges while at the same time exerting some guiding force. This Conclusion describes the separation of delegated and implementing acts along the substantive – procedural differentiation but also points to problems ahead. Thus, constitutional ambiguity, an inappropriate reliance on pre-Lisbon doctrine and the lack of a common vision continue to plague the law on EU administrative rule-making. To find a way to fulfil the promise of simplification that is part of the Lisbon reform, the EU institutions will all need to take the procedural safeguards around delegated and implementing acts more seriously.
Die Lissabonner Verträge haben die EU grundlegend transformiert. Eine der Gemeinschaften ist in der EU aufgegangen -- die andere, Euratom, besteht aber weiter. Im Lichte der tiefgreifenden Veränderungen, vor denen die EU im Zuge des Austritts eines Mitgliedstaates steht, ist das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und Euratom grundlegend zu klären. Wie verhält sich die Mitgliedschaft in der EU zur Mitgliedschaft in der Euratom? Der vorliegende Beitrag kommt zu dem Schluss, dass trotz getrennter rechtlicher Existenz beider Organisationen eine Mitgliedsschaft nur in beiden gleichzeitig möglich ist.
Inuit and Subjects in EU law
(2017)
Vortrag auf der ICON Konferenz 2017 in Kopenhagen zur Konstruktion des EU Rechtssubjekts anhand der Inuit Rechtsprechung des EuGH
Searching for Order. Exploring the use of delegated and implementing acts in the EU customs code
(2017)
Artikel über Unterschiede in der gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigung der Kommission unter Art. 290 AEUV gegenüber Art. 291 AEUV anhand des EU Zollkode. Der Artikel findet empirische Unterschiede insofern als Art. 290 AEUV für die Ermächtigung der Festsetzung von 'Bedingungen' verwendet wird, und Art. 291 AEUV für die Ermächtigung zur Festsetzung von Verfahrensregeln.
Article 191 EC ascribes several functions to "political parties at European level" and empowers the European Parliament and the Council to regulate the status and the financing of these parties. On this legal grounding the European Regulation on Political Parties was adopted in the year 2003 and entered into force on July, 20th.
A "political party at European level" is defined by the Regulation as a "political party" (association of citizens) or an "alliance of political parties" (structured cooperation between at least two political parties) which is electorally successful in at least one quarter of the 25 member States. Every party which is represented by elected members in regional assemblies in at least seven member States will receive money from the European budget. Such a party will at least share in the 15 percent from the total available public subvention. The lion's share (85%), however, will be divided among those parties which are also successful in European elections.
This applies to the existing party alliances on which the Regulation is obviously based, viz. the "Party of European Socialists" (PES) the "European People's Party" (EPP), the "European Liberal Democrats" (ELDR), the "European Federation of Green Parties" (EFGP) the "European Free Alliance" (EFA) and the "Party of the European Left", which was founded prior to the European elections.
The public subventions intended for European party alliances glaringly violate constitutional principles developed in Germany. These principles are not binding on European institutions. They are not, however, completely meaningless because they have political relevance, at least in Germany. They will also influence the creation of European principles in the field of party financing. The same is true for the standards developed by the Council of Europe.
The public funding system violates European primary law. This is true for Article 191 EC as well as for the principle of equality which is binding at European level too. All of these standards aim at two democratic principles:
<ol><li>promoting direct linkages between parties and citizens and</li>
<li>ensuring the openness and fairness of political competition.</li></ol>
The Regulation violates these principles in several aspects:
Defining the European party alliances as political parties violates the meaning of the term "political party". In the member States of the European Union, the membership of natural persons as well as the fielding of candidates in elections are necessary conditions to qualify as a political party. The term "political party" defined in this uniform manner is relevant at European level. However, the party alliances in their present form fail to meet either of the two conditions. In the Statutes of all European party alliances natural persons only play at most a marginal role. The fielding of candidates at elections is monopolised by the national parties. The European party alliances lack everything which actually makes a political party. Therefore, these party alliances are not political parties within the meaning of Article 191 EC. From the very outset then the entire Regulation is devoid of a legal basis.
Without natural persons as members and by not fielding electoral candidates, the European party alliances cannot meet the functions ascribed to them in Article 191 EC. They can neither "express the political will of citizens" nor "form a European awareness". Both can - according to democratic principles - only be achieved in a bottom-up process and not in a top-down process. The European party alliances can therefore not be defined as "parties at pan-European level".
The provision of public funding will further increase the distance between citizens and the European party alliances. It will reduce any interest within these party alliances to recruit natural persons as members or to strengthen their links with voters. The required 25 percent of "own resources" will in fact consist of membership fees from political parties, from parliamentary groups, party taxes and donations from national parliamentary groups which may also be partly funded out of the public budget. Therefore, a complete public funding of European party alliances will occur. That is not compatible with the principle of grass roots support.
The actual quantum of public funding is not defined in the Regulation itself, but remains to be set in the annual budget. Therefore, doors to a massive increase of the public funds are wide open because no relevant hurdles for the Parliament deciding on its own behalf exist. Increases are hidden among one of the many budget lines of the European Union. Any possible control by the fragmented nature of "European public opinion" is further weakened. The Council has to agree to the budget as a whole. However, based upon a "Gentleman's agreement" between Parliament and Council, neither body interferes with the adoption of the budget of the other body. We can, therefore, already foresee that the amount of 6.5 m. Euros set down for the year 2004 will soon explode. There is already talk of the need for about 100 m. Euros per year. This foreseeable and unchecked increase in public funding which in Germany itself is prevented by the so-called "absolute limit", equally violates the principle of voter support at the grass roots level.
Real political parties in the sense of associations of citizens, which would meet the requirements of Article 191 EC and which would be able to fulfil the functions defined by this article do not exist at European level and are given no realistic chance to emerge. They are factually excluded from public funds. They would have to achieve at least three percent of the votes in seven member States in order to participate alone in the 15 percent share. These conditions are prohibitive.
The criteria defined in the Regulation unnecessarily extend the inequalities of the European electoral system to the public funding of European parties. Accordingly, one vote from Luxemburg will not only have sixteen times as much weight as one vote from Germany, it will also bring the respective parties at European level sixteen times as much public funding. This is not compatible with the principle of equality. While inequalities in the distribution of seats in the European Parliament are laid down in primary law, corresponding reasons do not exist for the distribution of public subventions to political parties.
National thresholds in elections to the European Parliament also lead to inequalities. In member States without threshold, a mandate can be won with as few as 30,000 votes. In Germany about 1.6 m. votes are necessary, that is about 53 times as many. This conflicts with the principle of equality.
Reserving 85 percent of the funds for parties represented in the European Parliament and dividing the remaining 15 percent into equal shares, clearly advantages the established parties. This too is incompatible with the principle of equality. Keeping open the process of political competition requires more scope being allowed for possible political opponents.
An alternative compatible with the principle of equality would be to take into account only the number of votes won in European elections. This would prevent parties from larger member States or parties in member States with thresholds from being grossly disadvantaged. This alternative would conform with the requirements of the system since results in national or regional elections have nothing to do with the programs of European parties; nor is there any reason for them to influence the distribution of public funds to European parties.
Transferring control of the applicability criteria to the Bureau of the European Parliament places responsibility into the hands of a political institution. This creates the danger that established political forces might exclude their political opponents for spurious reasons.
From a German perspective the prohibition of donations exceeding 12,000 Euros is especially welcome because in Germany no such limits for donations exist. The requirement that donations of 500 Euros and above must be published also represents progress, even though the Regulation seems to allow donations to be split up, so that this limit can easily be circumvented.
Controls are deficient. Effective sanctions are almost totally absent. Only the refunding of funds improperly received is defined in the Regulation. Inaccurate declarations in the annual accounts, non-declaration of large donations, even the acceptance of prohibited donations: none of these lead to any legal consequences. Such donations are not required to be refunded, nor is there provision for any prosecution. The European Court of Justice could however, still bring the Regulation to a halt.
The introduction of public funding for political parties at the European level was inspired by three motives which have long guided the political class:
<ol><li>To gain access to public funds and to use the European budget for this purpose</li>
<li>To exclude political opponents and manipulate party competition in accordance with their own interests
and</li>
<li>To eliminate effective means of control over Parliament deciding on its own behalf.</li></ol>