Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (18) (remove)
Language
- English (18) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (18) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (18)
Keywords
- Abgeordneter (1)
- Beitritt (1)
- Deutschland / Bundestag (1)
- ECHR (1)
- EMRK (1)
- EU-Accession (1)
- EU-Beitritt (1)
- Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (1)
- Europäische Union (1)
- Immigration policy (1)
- Multi-level governance (1)
- Refugee crisis (1)
- automated decision-making (1)
- automatisierte Entscheidungen (1)
- legal decision-making (1)
Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsmanagement (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael Hölscher) (4)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (3)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Staatsrecht, Verwaltungsrecht und Europarecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Mario Martini) (2)
- Lehrstuhl für Sozialrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaft (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Constanze Janda) (1)
- Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschafts- und Verkehrspolitik (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Andreas Knorr) (1)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliche Betriebswirtschaftslehre (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Holger Mühlenkamp) (1)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Stelkens) (1)
From today's viewpoint it seems almost inconceivable that there once was a time where academia functioned without peer review processes, which are now so much part and parcel of the academic environment. Peer review is mainly taken for granted and we assume that it generally works well in estimating the worth of academic outputs of differents kinds (publications, grant proposals etc.) However, the process itself is not free of criticism and much can still be done to improve review quality. In this paper I explore and question the purpose and function of peer review, engage with various problems that can occur in the process, and make suggestions for ways in which peer review might be improved. It is based on empirical research, participation in various peer review forms and observation of accreditation practice.
This article outlines the his tory of several attempts to increase salaries and pensions of members of the German Bundestag in the early I990s. It shows the unethical tactics used by parliamentarians and the way in which public information was in part consciously designed to mislead. It is argued that Bundestag members tend to form a political cartel when decisions concerning their salaries and pensions are made. Similiar tendencies can be observed in all parliamentary decisions involving party finance, providing support for Katz and Mairs thesis that 'catch-all' parties are generally being replaced by 'cartel parties'. Having analysed the issues involved, the article calls for greater accountability and responsibility on the part of German politicians when their own personal advantage is at issue.