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Der moderne Krieg verwandelt sich mehr und mehr zu einem digitalen Schlachtfeld: Die Innovationen reichen von autonomen Waffensystemen über digitale Kommandostrukturen bis hin zu Cyberwaffen. Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Militärtechnologien sowie ihr höhe-res Maß an Autonomie gehen Hand in Hand mit einem erhöhten Risiko für internationalen Frieden und Sicherheit. Oft können diese Technologien als sog. Dual Use Güter aber auch zivil genutzt und global gehandelt werden. Sie bergen neben Risiken also ebenfalls ein Potenzial für die internationale wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Wie aber lässt sich verhindern, dass digitale Dual-Use Güter in die falschen Hände geraten, wie z. B. an diktatorische Regime oder Terroristen? Und ist es möglich, dabei einen fairen Ausgleich zwischen internationaler Sicherheit und internationaler Entwicklung herzustellen?
Digital technologies often have a dual-use nature, which means they can be used for both civil and military purposes. For instance, object recognition software can be used for auto-nomous civil driving or for autonomous targeting within armed drones. Thus, their uncon-trolled proliferation may pose risks to international peace and security. Generally, export controls aim to mitigate these risks while avoiding unreasonable restrictions on global trade and development. The novelty of digital dual-use items and the dynamics of their transfer pose new challenges for the international export control system and raise critical legal questions under international law. Does international law hold export control rules that sufficiently address the broad spectrum of relevant digital dual-use items and their rapid technological advancement? Furthermore, how do these rules treat the digital transfer of such items?
The presentation aims to answer these questions by, first, carving out the relevant inter-national export control rules. Secondly, the application of these rules to the digital dual-use items and their international transfer is analyzed. Finally, to the extent that the applicability is affirmed, the presentation will examine the international export control law’s requirements to the international transfer of digital dual-use items.
‘Killer Flying Robots Are Here. What Do We Do Now?’, ‘A Military Drone With A Mind Of Its Own Was Used In Combat, U.N. Says’ and ‘Possible First Use of AI-Armed Drones Triggers Alarm Bells’ – these are just some headlines to a report issued by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya. What caught the international attention was the panel’s description of the following scene in Libya’s civil war: ‘[Forces] were […] hunted down and remotely engaged by the un-manned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 […]. The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true “fire, forget and find” capability.’
However, the disruptive potential of AI is not limited to out-of-control killer drones or the military context in general – nor does it only have a negative potential. AI and its global trade promote international development and technological innovation, thereby improving lives. Therefore, the efforts to build a legal and policy framework to harness AI’s benefits and thwart its dangers is in full swing. States, the European Union, international organizations, NGOs, and scholars alike come up with ways of achieving that end. The approaches to the issue are manifold. However, most focus either on instating rules on the development of AI, for instance, how to ensure AI is built ethically or on its use, ie, banning its use in lethal auto-nomous weapon systems (LAWS). Whereas all these efforts are important, a further layer of protection has not gained much traction: regulating AI’s global trade so that responsible actors can use it to benefit humankind while preventing it from ending up in the hands of irresponsible actors.
The legal instrument to achieve this end is international export control law. It aims to mitiga-te the risks to international peace and security associated with the proliferation of sensitive items to irresponsible actors while avoiding unreasonable restrictions on global trade, eco-nomic development, and technological innovation. However, the international export control law is not yet suited to fulfill its promise regarding AI. The dual use nature of AI poses signifi-cant risks to international peace and security. Nevertheless, only in limited circumstances applies international export control law to the transfer of AI applications and technology, leaving a gap in the international export control framework. Until this gap is closed, inter-national human rights due diligence might provide fallback protection to address the issue
of mitigating the risks associated with the proliferation of dual use AI.