Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (1119)
- Part of a Book (798)
- Public lecture (627)
- Book (555)
- Conference Proceeding (281)
- Review (167)
- Part of a commentary (131)
- Contribution to a Periodical (106)
- Contribution to online periodical (95)
- Report (55)
Language
- German (3085)
- English (760)
- Other Language (110)
- French (85)
- Spanish (44)
- Multiple languages (6)
- Russian (1)
Has Fulltext
- no (4091) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4091)
Keywords
- Deutschland (48)
- Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (33)
- Digitalisierung (23)
- Diäten (16)
- Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung (16)
- Parteienfinanzierung (14)
- Jugend-Check (13)
- Politiker (12)
- DSGVO (11)
- Evaluation (11)
Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschafts- und Verkehrspolitik (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Andreas Knorr) (323)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Staatslehre und Rechtsvergleichung (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Karl-Peter Sommermann) (298)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Finanz- und Steuerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Joachim Wieland) (294)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (247)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Stelkens) (243)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Staatsrecht, Verwaltungsrecht und Europarecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Mario Martini) (200)
- Lehrstuhl für Politikwissenschaft (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stephan Grohs) (169)
- Lehrstuhl für vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft und Policy-Analyse (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael Bauer) (119)
- Seniorprofessur für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Politik und Recht im Bereich von Umwelt und Energie (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Eberhard Bohne) (102)
- Lehrstuhl für Sozialrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaft (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Constanze Janda) (89)
Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.
The TCA (EU-UK Trade and Copperation Agreement) establishes a very comprehensive institutional framework with Partnership Council and diverse Committees having partly substantial decision-making powers for the development of the TCA. These considerable public functions prompt legitimacy concerns as to their democratic control, which this article explores in detail. It will be shown that the exercise of public powers by TCA treaty bodies meets with a sobering legal situation regarding democratic control mechanisms over treaty body decision-making at different levels. Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the legal and legitimate transfer of powers requires additional safeguards as to their democratic legitimacy. Solutions for better control of treaty body decisions by parliaments must be developed at several levels simultaneously.
Trade relations face unprecedented challenges, which has led to an increased politicisation and contestation of trade rules. In response, the EU has changed its trade policy under the motto ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ towards a more as-sertive policy. The EU seeks to signifi-cantly expand its room of manoeuvre and to gain more autonomy by strengthening the en-forcement of its trade rights and by ensuring more effectively, including unilaterally, a level playing field. This re-orientation engenders several new or amended trade policy instru-ments, but meets with reservations as the renewed politicisation of EU trade policy will have internal consequences and raise demands for more democratic accountability of the Euro-pean Commission. The new policy instruments will enlarge its leeway in trade policy. The future of the EU's multilateral, rule- instead of power-oriented political stance becomes unclear, which might undermine its negotiation posi-tion in WTO reform and collide with the EU's respect for international law. The tensions of the EU's new hybrid approach with its international commitments even more fuel demands for increased accountability of the Commission as a safeguard against employing the new powers for protectionism and disrespect to international law. The contribution analyses the need for increased Commis-sion accountability in the redirected trade policy.
The European Commission
(2005)
Article 191 EC ascribes several functions to "political parties at European level" and empowers the European Parliament and the Council to regulate the status and the financing of these parties. On this legal grounding the European Regulation on Political Parties was adopted in the year 2003 and entered into force on July, 20th.
A "political party at European level" is defined by the Regulation as a "political party" (association of citizens) or an "alliance of political parties" (structured cooperation between at least two political parties) which is electorally successful in at least one quarter of the 25 member States. Every party which is represented by elected members in regional assemblies in at least seven member States will receive money from the European budget. Such a party will at least share in the 15 percent from the total available public subvention. The lion's share (85%), however, will be divided among those parties which are also successful in European elections.
This applies to the existing party alliances on which the Regulation is obviously based, viz. the "Party of European Socialists" (PES) the "European People's Party" (EPP), the "European Liberal Democrats" (ELDR), the "European Federation of Green Parties" (EFGP) the "European Free Alliance" (EFA) and the "Party of the European Left", which was founded prior to the European elections.
The public subventions intended for European party alliances glaringly violate constitutional principles developed in Germany. These principles are not binding on European institutions. They are not, however, completely meaningless because they have political relevance, at least in Germany. They will also influence the creation of European principles in the field of party financing. The same is true for the standards developed by the Council of Europe.
The public funding system violates European primary law. This is true for Article 191 EC as well as for the principle of equality which is binding at European level too. All of these standards aim at two democratic principles:
<ol><li>promoting direct linkages between parties and citizens and</li>
<li>ensuring the openness and fairness of political competition.</li></ol>
The Regulation violates these principles in several aspects:
Defining the European party alliances as political parties violates the meaning of the term "political party". In the member States of the European Union, the membership of natural persons as well as the fielding of candidates in elections are necessary conditions to qualify as a political party. The term "political party" defined in this uniform manner is relevant at European level. However, the party alliances in their present form fail to meet either of the two conditions. In the Statutes of all European party alliances natural persons only play at most a marginal role. The fielding of candidates at elections is monopolised by the national parties. The European party alliances lack everything which actually makes a political party. Therefore, these party alliances are not political parties within the meaning of Article 191 EC. From the very outset then the entire Regulation is devoid of a legal basis.
Without natural persons as members and by not fielding electoral candidates, the European party alliances cannot meet the functions ascribed to them in Article 191 EC. They can neither "express the political will of citizens" nor "form a European awareness". Both can - according to democratic principles - only be achieved in a bottom-up process and not in a top-down process. The European party alliances can therefore not be defined as "parties at pan-European level".
The provision of public funding will further increase the distance between citizens and the European party alliances. It will reduce any interest within these party alliances to recruit natural persons as members or to strengthen their links with voters. The required 25 percent of "own resources" will in fact consist of membership fees from political parties, from parliamentary groups, party taxes and donations from national parliamentary groups which may also be partly funded out of the public budget. Therefore, a complete public funding of European party alliances will occur. That is not compatible with the principle of grass roots support.
The actual quantum of public funding is not defined in the Regulation itself, but remains to be set in the annual budget. Therefore, doors to a massive increase of the public funds are wide open because no relevant hurdles for the Parliament deciding on its own behalf exist. Increases are hidden among one of the many budget lines of the European Union. Any possible control by the fragmented nature of "European public opinion" is further weakened. The Council has to agree to the budget as a whole. However, based upon a "Gentleman's agreement" between Parliament and Council, neither body interferes with the adoption of the budget of the other body. We can, therefore, already foresee that the amount of 6.5 m. Euros set down for the year 2004 will soon explode. There is already talk of the need for about 100 m. Euros per year. This foreseeable and unchecked increase in public funding which in Germany itself is prevented by the so-called "absolute limit", equally violates the principle of voter support at the grass roots level.
Real political parties in the sense of associations of citizens, which would meet the requirements of Article 191 EC and which would be able to fulfil the functions defined by this article do not exist at European level and are given no realistic chance to emerge. They are factually excluded from public funds. They would have to achieve at least three percent of the votes in seven member States in order to participate alone in the 15 percent share. These conditions are prohibitive.
The criteria defined in the Regulation unnecessarily extend the inequalities of the European electoral system to the public funding of European parties. Accordingly, one vote from Luxemburg will not only have sixteen times as much weight as one vote from Germany, it will also bring the respective parties at European level sixteen times as much public funding. This is not compatible with the principle of equality. While inequalities in the distribution of seats in the European Parliament are laid down in primary law, corresponding reasons do not exist for the distribution of public subventions to political parties.
National thresholds in elections to the European Parliament also lead to inequalities. In member States without threshold, a mandate can be won with as few as 30,000 votes. In Germany about 1.6 m. votes are necessary, that is about 53 times as many. This conflicts with the principle of equality.
Reserving 85 percent of the funds for parties represented in the European Parliament and dividing the remaining 15 percent into equal shares, clearly advantages the established parties. This too is incompatible with the principle of equality. Keeping open the process of political competition requires more scope being allowed for possible political opponents.
An alternative compatible with the principle of equality would be to take into account only the number of votes won in European elections. This would prevent parties from larger member States or parties in member States with thresholds from being grossly disadvantaged. This alternative would conform with the requirements of the system since results in national or regional elections have nothing to do with the programs of European parties; nor is there any reason for them to influence the distribution of public funds to European parties.
Transferring control of the applicability criteria to the Bureau of the European Parliament places responsibility into the hands of a political institution. This creates the danger that established political forces might exclude their political opponents for spurious reasons.
From a German perspective the prohibition of donations exceeding 12,000 Euros is especially welcome because in Germany no such limits for donations exist. The requirement that donations of 500 Euros and above must be published also represents progress, even though the Regulation seems to allow donations to be split up, so that this limit can easily be circumvented.
Controls are deficient. Effective sanctions are almost totally absent. Only the refunding of funds improperly received is defined in the Regulation. Inaccurate declarations in the annual accounts, non-declaration of large donations, even the acceptance of prohibited donations: none of these lead to any legal consequences. Such donations are not required to be refunded, nor is there provision for any prosecution. The European Court of Justice could however, still bring the Regulation to a halt.
The introduction of public funding for political parties at the European level was inspired by three motives which have long guided the political class:
<ol><li>To gain access to public funds and to use the European budget for this purpose</li>
<li>To exclude political opponents and manipulate party competition in accordance with their own interests
and</li>
<li>To eliminate effective means of control over Parliament deciding on its own behalf.</li></ol>
The Covid-19 pandemic is a multi-faceted crisis that challenges not only the health systems and other policy sub-systems in the single Member States, but also the European Union’s ability to provide policy responses that address the transnational nature of pandemic control as a union-wide ‘public good’ that affects health and social policies, border control and security as well as topics related to the single market. Thus, the pandemic constitutes a veritable capacity test for the EU integration project.
This article attempts to take stock of the Union’s early reaction to the first wave of the Covid-19 outbreak. After an introduction and a short note on the scope and methodology of the analysis a theoretical framework is developed. Scrutinising the pertinent literature on crisis management, we reflect the traditional hypothesis that in times of crisis the centre becomes more relevant against the background of the EU crisis management system, and discuss the role of informality in particular during the time of crisis. Against this backdrop, empirical evidence from interviews with EU officials and documents in selected policy fields (health and emergency management, digitalisation, and economic recovery) are analysed, before a discussion and conclusion complete the study.
The German Federal State
(2020)
Vom 22. bis 23. Juni 2017 fand an der Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam im Rahmen des Forschungsnetzwerks Public Contracts in Legal Globalization ein Workshop zum Thema „The impact of competitive tendering and its regulation on the formation and execution of public contracts and concessions” statt. Im Rahmen der Veranstaltung referierte Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Stelkens, der Mitglied des Steering Committees dieses Netzwerks ist, über den Ist-Stand in Deutschland.
In this paper, the 2015/16 budgetary effects of refugee immigration in Germany are analyzed. The Public sector spends billions of Euros to accommodate and supply refugees and to integrate those into the labor markets who have a perspective for a permanent or even medium-term residence permit. In case of a successful integration, we can expect flow backs in the form of income tax revenues and social security contributions. The costs and financial benefits of several types of refugees are modelled and – weighted with the number of cases – added to a public sector ‘financial balance’. Financial ‘profitability’ depends on labor market integration, the volume of labor participation and the future income earned, which depends on qualification, education and training. The levels of government will experience diverging cost-benefit balances. They will only receive future flow backs in the form of their share in the income tax revenues if refugees find jobs within their territories. Administrative efforts should concentrate on a successful labor market integration of refugees and no longer continue the policy of preventing them from entering the labor market for many years and thereby making them heavily dependent on public transfer payments.
.
The notion of civil service in Europe: establishing an analytical framework for comparative study
(2021)
Comparative study of the employment regimes of public officials in European countries requires an appropriate analytical framework, including definitions. This blog entry explores the meaning and scope of terms “civil service” and “civil servant”. It argues that a civil servant is an employee of the executive power, who has special duties and responsibilities, and should often meet specific requirements.