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In the case, Brzeziński v. Poland, the European Court of Human Rights for the third time addressed the issue of the summary electoral proceedings in the Polish legal system. The last judgement is an excellent opportunity to examine if the provisions of the electoral law concerning these proceedings are well designed and correctly interpreted by the Polish courts. There is no doubt that free elections and freedom of expression together form the bedrock of any democratic system. The two rights are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other. For this reason, it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely. On the other hand, national authorities are legitimised to create special proceedings in order to ensure the proper conduct of the electoral campaign by preventing the dissemination of false information. As a consequence, it is possible to verify factual statements contained in the materials pertaining to an electoral campaign. Special proceedings should not apply to the value judgements. If such comments and opinions infringe the candidate’s personal rights, he or she may seek redress under the general rules of protection of individual rights.
In the presentation, I analyse how the argument concerning constitutional (national) identity has been used in some EU Member States in order to evade international obligations and justify illiberal reforms.
The article presents the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 10 March 2022
(K 7/21). In this judgment, the Court questioned the constitutionality of the art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, one of the fundamental norms of the European system of human rights protection. The article criticises this decision and shows its negative consequences for the individual right to a fair trial.
El Estado de Derecho en Polonia. Cuando la pandemia se encuentra con el iliberalismo constitucional
(2020)
The article presents rule of law crisis in Poland provoked by covid-19 pandemic
In Central Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland, over the last years there are serious problems related to democracy, constitutional balance and the rule of law. In a short time, the illiberal political leaders put into practice an order that calls into question principles that form part of the axiological foundation of the European Union. This article explains why illiberalism has been so successful in this region and which techniques have been used to reinforce the political capture of various state institutions,especially the judiciary. The article also contains a critical analysis of the European Union’s attitude towards Hungarian and Polish illiberalism. The general hypothesis of this study is that Hungary and Poland have gone so far towards constitutional illiberalism, that it is extremely difficult to indicate the simple legal remedies for rapid return of these countries to liberal democracy.
The conference presentation explains the use of the scientific data in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
Electoral Disinformation and Summary Judicial Proceedings: Is the Polish Experience Relevant?
(2021)
In Poland special summary (24-hour) judicial proceedings against electoral disinformation were introduced in 1998. Although it has been successfully used to declare that information disseminated during an electoral campaign is false, it has not attracted much attention and
is generally absent from the current legal scholarship and international reports on electoral disinformation.
Against this backdrop, the post aims to critically analyze the Polish regulatory model con-cerning summary judicial proceedings. The implications of these mechanisms become even more complex when we consider that in mid-2019 the European Court of Human Rights found Poland for the third time in breach of the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights) for having convicted the applicant in these extraordinary 24 -hour judicial proceedings.
The lecture explains how some of the well-established institutions of constitutional law are being questioned. It explains also how the experience of the XX-century atrocities and the emergence of the authoritarian regimes in Europe impacted on the State Theory, Political Science and Constitutionalism.
It has become a truism that the Internet gives a range of private actors, such as social media, substantial power. They are thus able to control the communication processes, hold considerable authority over shaping opinions, and become the arbiters of free speech. That is why legal scholars and policymakers are searching for legal tools that would ensure a fair balance between the conflicting rights of these two groups of private actors (platforms and their users).
The aim of this presentation would be to reconsider the relationship between individuals and online platforms, analyze how horizontal online conflicts may be resolved (giving examples of some national legislation and EU proposal concerning digital services), and answer the question if the discretion of the platforms can be limited in order to protect rights and freedoms. The theoretical framework of the analysis would be the doctrine of the State’s positive obligations, as established in the current European Court of Human Rights case law.
The main argument would be that it is necessary to strengthen the public supervision over Internet platforms, in particular the way they resolve horizontal conflicts. The possibility of limiting their discretion, in order to provide individual protection, does not mean however creating the unlimited right of access to the platform in order to express any opinion or view (freedom of forum).
The purpose of this article is the general vision of judicial independence in the EU and its defence mechanisms. The article analyses the ways of the protection of this principle, as well as its development and substantial content in the context of the recent CJEU jurisprudence on the status of the judiciary in Poland. The first part of the article explains the techniques (of a political and legal nature) to guarantee judicial independence in the EU. The objective is to demonstrate how the procedure based on the Article 7 TEU, as well as the preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU) and infringement procedures (Article 258 TFEU) increment the enforceability of judicial independence. In the second part the article develops the concept of judicial independence and the detailed guarantees in this field, including rules for judicial appointments, the retirement regime, disciplinary responsibility and remuneration.
In the judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the retirement of Polish Supreme Court judges, declaring that the mechanism of arbitrary lowering the retirement age was not compatible with the European Union law. This commentary analyses the latest changes in the Polish judicial system and the CJEU's arguments. The study is focused in the change in European case-law and the development of instruments available to the EU institutions for monitoring judicial independence. The paper discusses also the elements of the judicial independence indicated by CJEU and the rules on the retirement of judges.
The article shows the process of normativization of scientific knowledge in the European Convention on Human Rights system. It argues that scientific and technological knowledge substantially impact tools used by the European Court of Human Rights, such as the living instrument doctrine, positive obligations, and European consensus.
This chapter analyses interrelations between the freedom of expression and the right to free election in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
This chapter analyses the impact of the Internet and the shift in communication processes on the States’ obligations emerging from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It claims that the environment created by the Internet is different from the traditional one; that is, it substantially empowers a range of private actors such as social media and other Internet platforms. That is why in the light of the actual development of the ECHR’s standards, both the strict distinction between positive and negative State’s obligations, and an overall prefe-rence for the latter are anachronistic. This chapter claims that it is crucial to keep developing European minimal safeguards in horizontal online relations when human rights violation is a result of a State’s non-compliance with the positive duty. Against this backdrop, this chapter centers around the influence of the Internet on the exercise and protection of selected human rights and the changing nature of communication processes, as well as the game-changing shift caused by the growing power of private actors. It also includes a detailed analysis of the scope and content of positive State’s obligations emerging from the use of the Internet, focusing on substantive obligations (i.e., the legal framework and the allocation of responsibilities), as well as on the issue of the public guarantees for online pluralism and procedural obligations (the duty to provide responses to allegations concerning online ill-treatment inflicted by private individuals).
On 7 October 2020, the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland declared the unconstitutionality of essential provisions of the Treaty on European Union, calling into question the principle of the primacy of EU law (judgment K 3/21). This decision is closely related to the Polish judicial reform that has been severely criticised by the CJEU for violating standards of judicial inde-pendence. This study first explains the process of political capture of the Polish Constitu-tional Court and then looks at the content of the K 3/21 judgment: the Polish Constitutional Tribunal attempt to reject the aforementioned case law of the CJEU on the grounds that the EU institutions have exceeded their competences. Secondly, this study aims to determine the extent of the Union’s competences in the area of the national judiciary, to explain the me-thods of resolving potential conflicts between national and EU laws and to analyse the conse-quences of the primacy principle. The key argument of this part of the article is that national judges have the faculty to examine, ex officio, the compatibility of a given national provision with EU law. This power cannot be limited by any national act, nor by the fact that there is a prior declaration of its constitutionality.