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Electoral disinformation has become one of the most challenging problems for democratic states. All of them are facing the phenomenon of - both online and offline - dissemination of false information during pre-electoral period, which is harmful for individual and collective rights. As a consequence, some European countries adopted special measures, including summary judicial proceedings in order to declare that information or materials used in elec-tioneering are false and to prohibit its further dissemination. There are already three rulings of the ECtHR concerning this expeditious judicial examination provided in the Polish law. In December 2018 France passed complex regulation against manipulation of information that include similar mechanisms. This article, basing on the ECtHR’s case law and some national experiences, attempts to define the minimal European standard for measures targeted at electoral disinformation, especially judicial summary proceeding. It contains the analysis of the notion of electoral disinformation, defines the state’s positive obligations in this sphere, and indicates mayor challenges for the legal framework. The principal argument is that summary judicial proceedings – if adequately designed – cannot be questioned from the Convention standpoint and provide a partial solution to the problem of electoral dis-information.
In Central Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland, over the last years there are serious problems related to democracy, constitutional balance and the rule of law. In a short time, the illiberal political leaders put into practice an order that calls into question principles that form part of the axiological foundation of the European Union. This article explains why illiberalism has been so successful in this region and which techniques have been used to reinforce the political capture of various state institutions,especially the judiciary. The article also contains a critical analysis of the European Union’s attitude towards Hungarian and Polish illiberalism. The general hypothesis of this study is that Hungary and Poland have gone so far towards constitutional illiberalism, that it is extremely difficult to indicate the simple legal remedies for rapid return of these countries to liberal democracy.
In the judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the retirement of Polish Supreme Court judges, declaring that the mechanism of arbitrary lowering the retirement age was not compatible with the European Union law. This commentary analyses the latest changes in the Polish judicial system and the CJEU's arguments. The study is focused in the change in European case-law and the development of instruments available to the EU institutions for monitoring judicial independence. The paper discusses also the elements of the judicial independence indicated by CJEU and the rules on the retirement of judges.
The article presents legal (constitutional) aspects of the emergency situation concerning the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The purpose of this article is the general vision of judicial independence in the EU and its defence mechanisms. The article analyses the ways of the protection of this principle, as well as its development and substantial content in the context of the recent CJEU jurisprudence on the status of the judiciary in Poland. The first part of the article explains the techniques (of a political and legal nature) to guarantee judicial independence in the EU. The objective is to demonstrate how the procedure based on the Article 7 TEU, as well as the preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU) and infringement procedures (Article 258 TFEU) increment the enforceability of judicial independence. In the second part the article develops the concept of judicial independence and the detailed guarantees in this field, including rules for judicial appointments, the retirement regime, disciplinary responsibility and remuneration.