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- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (242)
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The European Commission presented, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, scenarios on the future of the EU in 2025, which prompt the question as to their meaning for the future of EU administrative law. This article explores the implications of the scenarios for the future of EU executive rulemaking and its constitutional consequences. As some scenarios imply a more powerful political role of the Commission, and almost all expand the scope and usage of executive rulemaking, the executive power gains induce the need for more distinct constitutional guidelines for executive rulemaking and for strengthened parliamentary control, to preserve the institutional power balance between legislative and executive rulemaking. The analysis develops proposals insofar and demands respect for constitutional barriers already enshrined in EU primary law but not sufficiently addressed yet in institutional practice.
Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.
As WTO members increasingly invoke security exceptions and the first panel report insofar was issued in Russia-Traffic in Transit, the methodical and procedural preliminaries of their adjudication must be reassessed. The preliminaries pertain to justiciability and to the proper interpretive approach for their vague terms that seemingly imply considerable discretion to WTO members, all the more as general exceptions are subject to expansive interpretation. Reading security exceptions expansively appears not viable as they miss the usual safeguard against abuse (i.e. the chapeau of Arts XX GATT/XIV GATS). This lack of safeguards rather suggests caution in conceptualising them expansively, as do the systemic consequences of recent attempts to re-politicise security exceptions which run the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether. Furthermore, the appropriate standards of review and proof must be explored which have to strike a balance between control and deference in national security.
The present contribution analyses the Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU on CETA, which, in a surprisingly uncritical view of conceivable conflicts between the competences of the CETA Investment Tribunal on the one hand and those of the CJEU on the other hand, did not raise any objections. In first reactions, this opinion was welcomed as an extension of the EU's room for manoeuvre in investment protection. The investment court system under CETA, however, is only compatible with EU law to a certain extent, which the Court made clear in the text of the opinion, and the restrictions are likely to confine the leeway for EU external contractual relations. Due to their fundamental importance, these restrictions, derived by the CJEU from the autonomy of the Union legal order form the core subject of this contribution. In what follows, the new emphasis in the CETA opinion on the external autonomy of Union law will be analyzed first (II). Subsequently, the considerations of the CJEU on the delimitation of its competences from those of the CETA Tribunal will be critically examined. The rather superficial analysis of the CJEU in the CETA opinion is in contrast to its approach in earlier decisions as it misjudges problems and therefore only superficially leads to a clear delimitation of competences (III.). An exploration of the last part of the CJEU's autonomy analysis will follow, in which the CJEU tries to respond to the criticism of regulatory chill (IV). Here, by referring to the unhindered operation of the EU institutions in accordance with their constitutional framework, the CJEU identifies the new restrictions for investment protection mechanisms just mentioned, which takes back the previous comprehensive affirmation of jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal in one point and which raises many questions about its concrete significance, consequence, and scope of application.
Mixed agreements have been a preferred form of entering into international treaties chosen by the EU and its Member States, despite the complexities their usage implies. Recent attempts of the EU institutions to prefer the conclusion of EU only agreements to mixed agreements, as a consequence of the broad interpretation of EU exclusive trade competences by the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 are motivated by the hope for increased efficiency in EU treaty making. They, however, provoke criticism with regard to democratic legitimacy and the EU principle of conferral, which constrain the EU to adopt only those legal acts for which it is competent. As this criticism is particularly strong in Germany and led to constitutional challenges of EU only acts, the present contribution will explain the treatment of mixed agreements in the constitutional order of Germany and explore the constitutional challenges that EU only agreements pose to the German constitutional order. This discussion will thus show the German legal order’s continued preference for mixed agreements, in view of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Those constitutional challenges are particularly topical in view of the most recent case law of the CJEU that stressed the political leeway of the EU Council to choose, when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of EU agreements based on shard competences, between either an EU only agreement or a mixed agreement. This political leeway turns mixity into a facultative endeavour in the hands of the Council. Under the constitutional perceptions of the FCC, such type of facultative mixity meets with considerable constitutional concerns because it replaces what was formerly held obligatory mixity.
Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen
(2020)
Vorliegender Beitrag analysiert das CETA-Gutachten des EuGH 1/17, das in erstaunlich un-kritischer Betrachtung denkbarer Konflikte zwischen den Zuständigkeiten des CETA-Tribunals einerseits und denen des EuGH andererseits keine Einwände erkennen wollte. In ersten Reaktionen ist dieses Gutachten als Ausweitung des Bewegungsspielraums der EU im Bereich Investitionsschutz begrüßt worden. Jedenfalls das Investitionsgerichtssystem nach CETA ist indes nur mit gewissen Maßgaben unionskonform, die im Text des Gutachtens deutlich werden und geeignet sind, den Spielraum für die vertraglichen EU-Außen-beziehungen nicht unerheblich einzuengen. Diese vom EuGH an der Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung festgemachten Einschränkungen bilden wegen ihrer grundsätzlichen Bedeutung den zentralen Gegenstand vorliegender Betrachtung. Zunächst wird die Neu-akzentuierung der externen Autonomie des Unionsrechts im CETA Gutachten analysiert (II). Anschließend werden die Überlegungen des EuGH zur Abgrenzung seiner Zuständigkeiten von denen des CETA Tribunals kritisch beleuchtet. Die dabei zu beobachtende recht oberflächliche Analyse des EuGH steht im Gegensatz zum Herangehen des EuGH in früheren Entscheidungen, verkennt Problemstellungen und führt daher nur scheinbar zu einer sauberen Abgrenzbarkeit der Zuständigkeiten (III.). Dem folgt eine Betrachtung des letzten Teiles der Autonomieanalyse des EuGH, in der er sich der Kritik des regulatory chill zuwendet (IV). Hier formuliert der EuGH mit dem Abstellen auf die ungehinderte Funktion der EU-Organe gemäß ihrem verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmen die eben angesprochene neue Schranke für Investitionsschutzmechanismen, die die zuvor umfassend bejahte Zuständigkeit des CETA-Tribunals in einem Punkt zurücknimmt und die darüber hinaus viele Fragen nach ihrer konkreten Bedeutung und Konsequenz, aber auch nach ihrem Anwendungsbereich aufwirft. Abschließend wird angesichts der Dürftigkeit der Begründung des EuGH eine Rekonstruktion dieser Schranke unternommen, die die für eine Begründung maßgeblichen Ansätze aus dem Schutz der demokratischen Entscheidungsfreiheit in der EU entfaltet (V.).