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This thesis explores the principles of administrative punishment under the European Con-vention of Human Rights (ECHR). Administrative punishment, for its part, is gaining popularity across European legal systems because it is a flexible, speedy and cost-efficient option. More precisely, it allows public authorities to inflict punishment without having to undergo a judi-cial action. The procedural safeguards that the concerned individual can expect are accor-dingly lower. However, whilst at the national and European Union levels the academic atten-tion grew in line with the gradual expansion of the use of administrative punishment, the same cannot be said regarding the legal framework of the Council of Europe (‘CoE’). Compre-hensive scholarly works on the subject matter are still missing and only a few authors are researching administrative sanctions within this framework more profoundly, i.e., in a cross-cutting manner.
This is regrettable because nowadays, one can speak of a rich and congruent body of admini-strative punishment under the CoE’s law. Not only has the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) admitted administrative sanctions within its remit since the famous Engel case in 1976, but it also interprets all relevant terms found in the letter of ECHR such as ‘criminal charge’, ‘penal procedure’, and ‘penalty’ autonomously and in harmony with one another. Autonomous interpretation of these key terms by using Engel criteria means that administra-tive sanctions can, and often are, put under scrutiny (as long as they bear ‘punitive’ and ‘de-terrent’ hallmarks). All in all, the following normative sources can be said to comprise the ius puniendi administrativus within the legal framework of the CoE: First, Article 6 ECHR, which ensures the procedural protection for administrative sanctioning by enshrining the right to a fair trial and its various components, i.e., by laying down a range of participatory and defence rights, as well as the possibility to have access to judicial review and the presumption of inno-cence. Secondly, Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, which stipulates ne bis in idem prin-ciple precluding double jeopardy. Thirdly, Article 7 ECHR is essential in giving substantive pro-tection to the subject-matter, and lays down the requirement of legality including regulatory quality, non-retroactive application of administrative sanctions, and no punishment without personal liability. Finally, Recommendation No. R (91) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to the Members States on administrative sanctions of 13 February 1991 as a ‘soft’ yet authoritative legal act creates boundaries for acceptable administrative sanctioning. All of these normative sources form the backbone of the research.
This thesis intends to fill the aforementioned academic gap and contribute to the legal scho-larship. It furthermore aspires to be a useful source for practitioners working within the field of public law who are empowered to regulate on or impose administrative sanctions. For this reason, the following research questions are tackled: What is a sanction? What purposes does it serve in a legal system? What is an administrative sanction in particular? What are its role and idiosyncratic features? What aims does it follow? How can it be differentiated from other types of public admonition, i.e., from criminal law measures? How do the CoE and the ECtHR conceptualize an administrative sanction? What guarantees stipulated by the ECHR are applicable to these sanctions? To what extent do they apply? Are there any limitations? If so, then what are the implications thereof on the individual rights? Is the current level of pro-tection in the field of administrative punishment regarding fundamental rights sufficient?
The thesis has furthermore sought to verify the following hypothesis: “The ECtHR acknowled-ges certain minimum requirements stemming from the ECHR from which the administrative authorities imposing a punitive administrative measure upon the individual, cannot deviate”. The hypothesis was drafted similarly to the wording of Article 6 (3) ECHR, which, together with other paragraphs of this Article, enlists fundamental individual guarantees for (any kind of) punishment (“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights […]”).
Kann es ein harmonisches Miteinander von EuGH und EGMR ohne Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention geben?
Das ist die Frage, die sich seit Gutachten 2/13 stellt, mit dem der EuGH den Beitrittsprozess für unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen hat. Die jüngere Vergangenheit
zeigt, dass grundrechtliche Alleingänge des EuGH durchaus
möglich sind, dass sie sich aber auch im Dialog der Gerichte überwinden
lassen, wenngleich mit einem größeren Aufwand und einem ungewissen Ausgang. Die externe grundrechtliche Kontrolle bleibt daher der Königsweg, auch wenn er sich in absehbarer Zeit wohl nicht verwirklichen lassen wird.
Kann es ein harmonisches Miteinander von EuGH und EGMR ohne Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention geben? Das ist die Frage, die sich seit Gutachten 2/13 stellt, mit dem der EuGH den Beitrittsprozess für unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen hat. Die jüngere Vergangenheit zeigt, dass grundrechtliche Alleingänge des EuGH durchaus möglich sind, dass sie sich aber auch im Dialog der Gerichte überwinden lassen, wenngleich mit einem größeren Aufwand und einem ungewissen Ausgang. Die externe grundrechtliche Kontrolle bleibt daher der Königsweg, auch wenn er sich in absehbarer Zeit wohl nicht verwirklichen lassen wird.
Provided for under the Treaty of Lisbon, the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is destined to be a landmark in European
legal history because it will finally make it possible for individuals and undertakings
to apply to the European Court of Human Rights for review of the acts of European
Union institutions. After nearly three years of negotiations, a draft agreement on European
Union accession was adopted on 5 April 2013. In the light of the draft agreement,
this publication offers a concise analysis of the reasons for European Union accession to the Convention, the means by which this is to be achieved and the effects it will have.
On ne peut plus aujourd’hui s’arrêter au contenu des droits fondamentaux sans se demander comment ils sont
appliqués. Quand il s’agit pour le droit de l’Union d’appliquer les droits fondamentaux, il semble traversé par des tensions
conceptuelles et méthodologiques fortes, à la recherche d’un point d’équilibre. Les développements les plus récents consécutifs à l’avis 2/13 montrent qu’une certaine convergence entre le droit de
l'Union et la Convention est possible.
This article offers an in-depth analysis of the relationship between European law and the
case-law born of the European Convention. The author addresses the tension between
the drive for legal certainty and the need to expand fundamental rights. By offering an
overview of the legal reality that this tension has created, the author seeks to find the balance
between needless plurality and rigid certainty. Through this overview, the author argues
that the promotion of fundamental rights must be organised along lines of harmony and
not of uniformity. To do this, he offers a detailed analysis of the respective approaches
to the detention of asylum seekers and to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
article thus traces the increasingly inter-referential nature of Strasbourg and Luxembourg
jurisprudence, arguing that this trend has the potential to promote fundamental rights, as
long as the jurisdiction of human rights’ legislation is significantly expanded. The author
goes on to discuss the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, looking at the ways in which
it grew out of jurisprudence from both legal systems and how this cross-pollination may
change the expansion of fundamental rights in a wider sense.
Erstaunlicherweise ist über die „Tragweite" von Grundrechten bis heute recht
wenig geschrieben worden. Der Begriff wird in Art. 52 Abs. 3 der EU-Grundrechtecharta verwendet und verweist auf einen Bestandteil der Rechte aus der Europaischen
Menschenrechtskonvention, die von der Charta ubemommen
wurden. Seine Verwendung in diesem Zusammenhang bietet Anlass fur Überlegungen
über die Stellung der Grundrechte im Unionsrecht, welche mit dem Lissabonner
Vertrag und vor allem der Grundrechtecharta eine neue Dimension erhalten haben
dürfte.
In einem ersten
Schritt wird die Bedeutung der europäischen Grundrechte
fur den Verwaltungsrechtsraum Europa anhand einiger
konkreter Beispiele untersucht. Im Licht dieser
Erkenntnisse wird in einem zweiten Schritt die
Frage erörtert, inwiefern heute uberhaupt von einem
„Grundrechtsraum Europa" gesprochen werden
kann, was also ein solcher Grundrechtsraum voraussetzt
und was davon bereits erfüllt ist.
Mit dem Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen
Menschenrechtskonvention ist der Vorgang gemeint, bei dem die EU Vertragspartei der EMRK werden soll mit der Folge, dass auch sie damit der Gerichtsbarkeit des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte
unterworfen sein wird. Mehr als dreißig Jahre ist davon
schon die Rede, aber der Lissabonner Vertrag, der die EU zu diesem Beitritt auffordert und dazu die Rechtsgrundlage
schafft, hat diesem Projekt einen neuen Elan gegeben.