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Un bilan de la Charte doit également prendre en compte son interaction avec les autres textes internationaux de protection des droits fondamentaux. La Convention occupe une place centrale à cet égard, car chaque fois que les juges nationaux appliquent le droit de l’Union, ils doivent le faire dans le respect de la Convention. D’où l’importance de la cohérence entre la Convention et la Charte, car in fine, le contrôle du respect des droits fondamentaux dans un cas concret se fait à Strasbourg. Eu égard à cette réalité, le législateur de l’Union a instauré un double contrôle de cohérence entre la Charte et la Convention : le premier, interne à l’Union, s’exerce sur la base de l’article 52(3) de la Charte ; le second, qui le complète, est appelé à s’exercer à travers le contrôle externe par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, prévu par l’article 6(2) TUE. S’agissant du contenu des droits fondamentaux, le contrôle interne de cohérence a bien fonctionné. On ne peut pas en dire autant s’agissant de la méthodologie des droits. Dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’UE, en effet, tout se passe comme si l’article 52(3) de la Charte ne concernait que le contenu des droits, à l’exclusion de leur méthodologie. Aussi cette jurisprudence génère-t-elle des divergences méthodologiques qui conduisent tantôt à des déficits de protection par rapport à la Convention, tantôt à la confusion juridique. Ces défaillances du contrôle interne rendent nécessaire la mise en place du contrôle externe.
Legal acts performed by EU Member States applying Union law come within the scope of the Convention and can give rise to adjudication by the ECtHR. A long series of judgments illus-trate the ECtHR’s approach regarding the application of Union law by the courts of EU Mem-ber States. The Convention and Union law are not two autonomous systems separated by a watertight fence. Both European Courts should therefore adopt a wholistic approach in this area, because only a wholistic view takes full account of the legal reality which is one of inter-action and intertwining. The ECtHR makes abundant use of EU law sources, thereby always explicitly referring to them. Three different categories of cases can be identified in how the CJEU goes about the Convention in its case-law.
The landmark judgment in the case of Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France, which concerned the execution of a European arrest warrant, provides a good illustration of the effects of the Con-vention liability of EU Member States for their implementation of EU law. These effects touch on such notions as cooperation, trust, complementarity, autonomy and responsibility. The two European courts have been cooperating towards some convergence of the standards applicable to the handling of EAWs. The Bosphorus presumption and its application in Bivo-laru and Moldovan show the amount of trust placed by the Strasbourg Court in the EU pro-tection of fundamental rights in this area. To the extent that their standards of protection coincide, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg jurisdictions are complementary. However, the two protection systems remain autonomous, notably as regards the methodology applied to fundamental rights. Ultimately, the EU Member States engage their Convention responsibility for the execution by their domestic courts of any EAWs.
Kann es ein harmonisches Miteinander von EuGH und EGMR ohne Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention geben?
Das ist die Frage, die sich seit Gutachten 2/13 stellt, mit dem der EuGH den Beitrittsprozess für unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen hat. Die jüngere Vergangenheit
zeigt, dass grundrechtliche Alleingänge des EuGH durchaus
möglich sind, dass sie sich aber auch im Dialog der Gerichte überwinden
lassen, wenngleich mit einem größeren Aufwand und einem ungewissen Ausgang. Die externe grundrechtliche Kontrolle bleibt daher der Königsweg, auch wenn er sich in absehbarer Zeit wohl nicht verwirklichen lassen wird.
Erstaunlicherweise ist über die „Tragweite" von Grundrechten bis heute recht
wenig geschrieben worden. Der Begriff wird in Art. 52 Abs. 3 der EU-Grundrechtecharta verwendet und verweist auf einen Bestandteil der Rechte aus der Europaischen
Menschenrechtskonvention, die von der Charta ubemommen
wurden. Seine Verwendung in diesem Zusammenhang bietet Anlass fur Überlegungen
über die Stellung der Grundrechte im Unionsrecht, welche mit dem Lissabonner
Vertrag und vor allem der Grundrechtecharta eine neue Dimension erhalten haben
dürfte.
Grundrechtsschutz und gegenseitige Anerkennung im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts
(2014)
Der Grundrechtsschutz gerät zunehmend in den Mittelpunkt der Diskussionen über die
gegenseitige Anerkennung von Gerichtsentscheidungen im Unionsrecht, wie auch die
neuere Rechtsprechung des EuGH und manche Reaktion darauf belegen. Es geht dabei
nicht nur um die Frage, welche Grundrechte, nationale oder europäische, angewandt werden sollen, sondern auch darum, wo sie zur Anwendung kommen sollen, im Ausstellungs- oder
im Vollstreckungsstaat? Bei der Beantwortung dieser Fragen ist das Wesen der Grundrechte sowie die besondere Rolle, die ihnen dementsprechend in jedem Rechtssystem zukommen soll, zu berücksichtigen,
will man die Grundrechte nicht zu „einfachen Rechten“ verkommen lassen.
This article offers an in-depth analysis of the relationship between European law and the
case-law born of the European Convention. The author addresses the tension between
the drive for legal certainty and the need to expand fundamental rights. By offering an
overview of the legal reality that this tension has created, the author seeks to find the balance
between needless plurality and rigid certainty. Through this overview, the author argues
that the promotion of fundamental rights must be organised along lines of harmony and
not of uniformity. To do this, he offers a detailed analysis of the respective approaches
to the detention of asylum seekers and to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
article thus traces the increasingly inter-referential nature of Strasbourg and Luxembourg
jurisprudence, arguing that this trend has the potential to promote fundamental rights, as
long as the jurisdiction of human rights’ legislation is significantly expanded. The author
goes on to discuss the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, looking at the ways in which
it grew out of jurisprudence from both legal systems and how this cross-pollination may
change the expansion of fundamental rights in a wider sense.
The hybrid EPPO structure is operating under a hybrid set of fundamental rights, thus calling into question the well-established principle of the single set of norms applicable throughout criminal proceedings. Moreover, the system is characterized by a distortion of the commonly applied logical link between liability for violations of fundamental rights and control over the actions entailing those violations. EU Member States risk being held accountable under the Convention for actions on behalf of the EPPO which they did not fully control and which were subject to a different corpus of fundamental rights. The EU, for its part, takes the risk of seeing EPPO prosecutions being invalidated by domestic courts applying a Convention protection level which may be higher than the Union level. The only way to minimize the impact of these distortions is for the EU to become a Contracting Party to the Convention, along with its own Member States. This would do away with the ambivalence of the legal framework characterizing the protection of fundamental rights under the EPPO Regulation. It would also contribute to a better implementation of the principles of the rule of law and procedural fairness, advocated by the Regulation itself. Such a move would seem all the more important in light of the fact that if the EPPO proves successful, its competence might be extended in the future to other areas.
Mit dem Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen
Menschenrechtskonvention ist der Vorgang gemeint, bei dem die EU Vertragspartei der EMRK werden soll mit der Folge, dass auch sie damit der Gerichtsbarkeit des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte
unterworfen sein wird. Mehr als dreißig Jahre ist davon
schon die Rede, aber der Lissabonner Vertrag, der die EU zu diesem Beitritt auffordert und dazu die Rechtsgrundlage
schafft, hat diesem Projekt einen neuen Elan gegeben.
Article 6(2) TEU provides that the EU shall accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the EU accession project has been significantly delayed by Opinion 2/13 of the ECJ. At the same time, there appears to be some harmony in the case law of the two European Courts, which could lead to the status quo being considered as a valid alternative to EU accession. It might therefore be tempting to remove Article 6(2) altogether from the TEU at the next revision of the Treaties. This paper argues that Article 6(2) should stay in the TEU, because a closer look reveals that the current status quo is not satisfactory: it does not allow an adequate representation of the EU in the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights, nor is it capable of ensuring in the long-term comprehensive and stable consistency between EU law and the Convention. Moreover, removing Article 6(2) TEU would undermine the very idea of a collective understanding and enforcement of fundamental rights. This could initiate a process leading to the current European architecture of fundamental rights protection being unravelled altogether. Hence, there is no return from Article 6(2) TEU. Neither is there from actually implementing it.
The picture regarding the protection of fundamental rights in Europe today increasingly looks like a patchwork, due to a lack of coordination at different levels. Developments reinforcing that picture include the emergence of different methodologies for the application of funda-mental rights, Constitution-based challenges to European law by national Supreme Courts, codifications of existing case-law and the creation of so-called « hybrid » institutions. The resulting complexity is a challenge for domestic courts, a threat to the confidence of citizens and detrimental to the fundamental rights themselves, their special role and authority being gradually eroded by a general relativism. EU-accession could have an anti-patchwork effect and represent a chance for a general coordination of fundamental rights in Europe. Beyond making the Convention binding upon the EU, it would also have a pan-European (re)structu-ring effect by confirming the Convention as the minimum benchmark providing both the bedrock and the framework for any other national or European fundamental rights as well as for the necessary judicial dialogue on the latter. Good progress has been achieved since the resumption of negotiations for EU-accession, justifying cautious optimism as to the possibility to find adequate solutions to the outstanding issues.
Kann es ein harmonisches Miteinander von EuGH und EGMR ohne Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention geben? Das ist die Frage, die sich seit Gutachten 2/13 stellt, mit dem der EuGH den Beitrittsprozess für unbestimmte Zeit unterbrochen hat. Die jüngere Vergangenheit zeigt, dass grundrechtliche Alleingänge des EuGH durchaus möglich sind, dass sie sich aber auch im Dialog der Gerichte überwinden lassen, wenngleich mit einem größeren Aufwand und einem ungewissen Ausgang. Die externe grundrechtliche Kontrolle bleibt daher der Königsweg, auch wenn er sich in absehbarer Zeit wohl nicht verwirklichen lassen wird.
In einem ersten
Schritt wird die Bedeutung der europäischen Grundrechte
fur den Verwaltungsrechtsraum Europa anhand einiger
konkreter Beispiele untersucht. Im Licht dieser
Erkenntnisse wird in einem zweiten Schritt die
Frage erörtert, inwiefern heute uberhaupt von einem
„Grundrechtsraum Europa" gesprochen werden
kann, was also ein solcher Grundrechtsraum voraussetzt
und was davon bereits erfüllt ist.
Protocol No. 16 and EU Law
(2015)
Protocol No. 16 will allow the highest courts of the Contracting States to the European Convention on Human Rights Convention to request an advisory opinion from the European Court of Human Rights on "questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention or the protocols thereto". However, in its Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice of the European Union expressed reservations in respect of that Protocol. The article analyses those reservations and looks for ways to dispell them.
Par trois arrêts récents, la grande chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme précise les exigences et limites de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme dans le domaine migratoire.
L’interaction et la complémentarité entre la Convention et le droit de l’Union dans ce domaine sont à la fois matérielles et procédurales.
Une approche globale est requise, car les juges nationaux des États membres sont tenus d’appliquer le droit de l’Union dans le respect de la Convention.
Wintersemester 2009/2010
(2010)
On ne peut plus aujourd’hui s’arrêter au contenu des droits fondamentaux sans se demander comment ils sont
appliqués. Quand il s’agit pour le droit de l’Union d’appliquer les droits fondamentaux, il semble traversé par des tensions
conceptuelles et méthodologiques fortes, à la recherche d’un point d’équilibre. Les développements les plus récents consécutifs à l’avis 2/13 montrent qu’une certaine convergence entre le droit de
l'Union et la Convention est possible.
Sommersemester 2023
(2023)
Wintersemester 2015/2016
(2016)
Provided for under the Treaty of Lisbon, the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is destined to be a landmark in European
legal history because it will finally make it possible for individuals and undertakings
to apply to the European Court of Human Rights for review of the acts of European
Union institutions. After nearly three years of negotiations, a draft agreement on European
Union accession was adopted on 5 April 2013. In the light of the draft agreement,
this publication offers a concise analysis of the reasons for European Union accession to the Convention, the means by which this is to be achieved and the effects it will have.
Wintersemester 2017/2018
(2018)
Wintersemester 2010/2011
(2011)
Sommersemester 1998
(1998)
Wintersemester 2002/2003
(2003)
Wintersemester 2011/2012
(2012)
Wintersemester 2003/2004
(2004)
Wintersemester 2000/2001
(2000)
This thesis explores the principles of administrative punishment under the European Con-vention of Human Rights (ECHR). Administrative punishment, for its part, is gaining popularity across European legal systems because it is a flexible, speedy and cost-efficient option. More precisely, it allows public authorities to inflict punishment without having to undergo a judi-cial action. The procedural safeguards that the concerned individual can expect are accor-dingly lower. However, whilst at the national and European Union levels the academic atten-tion grew in line with the gradual expansion of the use of administrative punishment, the same cannot be said regarding the legal framework of the Council of Europe (‘CoE’). Compre-hensive scholarly works on the subject matter are still missing and only a few authors are researching administrative sanctions within this framework more profoundly, i.e., in a cross-cutting manner.
This is regrettable because nowadays, one can speak of a rich and congruent body of admini-strative punishment under the CoE’s law. Not only has the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) admitted administrative sanctions within its remit since the famous Engel case in 1976, but it also interprets all relevant terms found in the letter of ECHR such as ‘criminal charge’, ‘penal procedure’, and ‘penalty’ autonomously and in harmony with one another. Autonomous interpretation of these key terms by using Engel criteria means that administra-tive sanctions can, and often are, put under scrutiny (as long as they bear ‘punitive’ and ‘de-terrent’ hallmarks). All in all, the following normative sources can be said to comprise the ius puniendi administrativus within the legal framework of the CoE: First, Article 6 ECHR, which ensures the procedural protection for administrative sanctioning by enshrining the right to a fair trial and its various components, i.e., by laying down a range of participatory and defence rights, as well as the possibility to have access to judicial review and the presumption of inno-cence. Secondly, Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, which stipulates ne bis in idem prin-ciple precluding double jeopardy. Thirdly, Article 7 ECHR is essential in giving substantive pro-tection to the subject-matter, and lays down the requirement of legality including regulatory quality, non-retroactive application of administrative sanctions, and no punishment without personal liability. Finally, Recommendation No. R (91) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to the Members States on administrative sanctions of 13 February 1991 as a ‘soft’ yet authoritative legal act creates boundaries for acceptable administrative sanctioning. All of these normative sources form the backbone of the research.
This thesis intends to fill the aforementioned academic gap and contribute to the legal scho-larship. It furthermore aspires to be a useful source for practitioners working within the field of public law who are empowered to regulate on or impose administrative sanctions. For this reason, the following research questions are tackled: What is a sanction? What purposes does it serve in a legal system? What is an administrative sanction in particular? What are its role and idiosyncratic features? What aims does it follow? How can it be differentiated from other types of public admonition, i.e., from criminal law measures? How do the CoE and the ECtHR conceptualize an administrative sanction? What guarantees stipulated by the ECHR are applicable to these sanctions? To what extent do they apply? Are there any limitations? If so, then what are the implications thereof on the individual rights? Is the current level of pro-tection in the field of administrative punishment regarding fundamental rights sufficient?
The thesis has furthermore sought to verify the following hypothesis: “The ECtHR acknowled-ges certain minimum requirements stemming from the ECHR from which the administrative authorities imposing a punitive administrative measure upon the individual, cannot deviate”. The hypothesis was drafted similarly to the wording of Article 6 (3) ECHR, which, together with other paragraphs of this Article, enlists fundamental individual guarantees for (any kind of) punishment (“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights […]”).