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- Lehrstuhl für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsmanagement (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael Hölscher) (4)
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From today's viewpoint it seems almost inconceivable that there once was a time where academia functioned without peer review processes, which are now so much part and parcel of the academic environment. Peer review is mainly taken for granted and we assume that it generally works well in estimating the worth of academic outputs of differents kinds (publications, grant proposals etc.) However, the process itself is not free of criticism and much can still be done to improve review quality. In this paper I explore and question the purpose and function of peer review, engage with various problems that can occur in the process, and make suggestions for ways in which peer review might be improved. It is based on empirical research, participation in various peer review forms and observation of accreditation practice.
The European Commission presented, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, scenarios on the future of the EU in 2025, which prompt the question as to their meaning for the future of EU administrative law. This article explores the implications of the scenarios for the future of EU executive rulemaking and its constitutional consequences. As some scenarios imply a more powerful political role of the Commission, and almost all expand the scope and usage of executive rulemaking, the executive power gains induce the need for more distinct constitutional guidelines for executive rulemaking and for strengthened parliamentary control, to preserve the institutional power balance between legislative and executive rulemaking. The analysis develops proposals insofar and demands respect for constitutional barriers already enshrined in EU primary law but not sufficiently addressed yet in institutional practice.
Electoral disinformation has become one of the most challenging problems for democratic states. All of them are facing the phenomenon of - both online and offline - dissemination of false information during pre-electoral period, which is harmful for individual and collective rights. As a consequence, some European countries adopted special measures, including summary judicial proceedings in order to declare that information or materials used in elec-tioneering are false and to prohibit its further dissemination. There are already three rulings of the ECtHR concerning this expeditious judicial examination provided in the Polish law. In December 2018 France passed complex regulation against manipulation of information that include similar mechanisms. This article, basing on the ECtHR’s case law and some national experiences, attempts to define the minimal European standard for measures targeted at electoral disinformation, especially judicial summary proceeding. It contains the analysis of the notion of electoral disinformation, defines the state’s positive obligations in this sphere, and indicates mayor challenges for the legal framework. The principal argument is that summary judicial proceedings – if adequately designed – cannot be questioned from the Convention standpoint and provide a partial solution to the problem of electoral dis-information.
National immigration policies increasingly meet with fierce political resistance from lower levels of government, in particular municipalities. Amongst industrialized countries, the USA and Germany are probably the most extreme examples. In the USA, a growing numbers of subnational entities, including some of the country’s largest cities, openly refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. In retaliation, the Trump administrations has threatened several of these so-called ‘sanctuary cities’ to claim back past and to withdraw further federal funding from a number of jointly funded programs. Several court cases in this matter are pending. In stark contrast, an increasing number of German municipalities – labelled by the author as ‘non-sanctuary cities’ - have sought from their respective state governments a formal limitation of migration inflows into their territory, citing an overload on critical local administrative and not least housing resources. This paper contributes to the pertinent literature on multi-level governance in the area of immigration, first, by applying the economic theory of fiscal federalism to identify the theoretically appropriate level of government for defining and enforcing immigration policy. Second, the phenomenon of ‘sanctuary cities’ vs. ‘non-sanctuary cities’ and their potential impact on the design and enforcement of national immigration policies will be analyzed.
This article outlines the his tory of several attempts to increase salaries and pensions of members of the German Bundestag in the early I990s. It shows the unethical tactics used by parliamentarians and the way in which public information was in part consciously designed to mislead. It is argued that Bundestag members tend to form a political cartel when decisions concerning their salaries and pensions are made. Similiar tendencies can be observed in all parliamentary decisions involving party finance, providing support for Katz and Mairs thesis that 'catch-all' parties are generally being replaced by 'cartel parties'. Having analysed the issues involved, the article calls for greater accountability and responsibility on the part of German politicians when their own personal advantage is at issue.