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Can parliament govern the transport transition? How the German Bundestag scrutinizes rail projects
(2022)
The paper aims to elucidate to what extent the German Parliament exerts control over rail planning. Parliament has the budgetary right, but information asymmetries vis-à-vis the railway company Deutsche Bahn and the Ministry of Transport make parliamentary control difficult.
Recently, Germany has instituted a parliamentary review process that allows the Parliament to take up concerns by the public affected by rail projects. We use the principal-agent theory to model this new institution. Parliament delegates rail planning to the Deutsche Bahn, while the Federal Railway Authority serves as a budget watchdog, and parliament uses input from public participation as a deck-stacking procedure. The paper first situates the institutional innovations—the new parliamentary oversight procedure—against the former logic of rail-way planning. Second, based on the documentation of parliamentary oversight, we analyze for which demands by the affected public the Parliament uses its power to change rail projects.
The paper showed that public participation matters. The German Parliament introduced expensive changes to rail projects. In particular, demands that had been voiced in well-institutionalized public participation (that is, when municipalities, regional associations, etc., were engaged in long-term institutionalized dialogues with the Deutsche Bahn) were more likely to be addressed. An Extra budget was then allocated to, for example, noise-regulating measures.
To sum up, the German Parliament uses information gained in public participation in com-bination with its budget rights to exert control over railway planning for conflictual projects. Thus, Parliament takes a more active role in railway planning. Whether this also leads to more acceptance for rail projects, is an open question.
Wolfgang Weiss’ contribution on “Constitutional Challenges to EU Administrative Soft Law During the Covid-19 Pandemic and Some Proposed Remedies” Studies how during the Covid-19 pandemic, as EU member states struggled to deal with the pandemic, EU officials increasingly resorted to so-called “soft law” to provide guidance to member states. He concludes that, while there are benefits to using EU soft law for crisis management and domestic implementation of EU, he raises concerns regarding their challenges for democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. He contends that these challenges should be addressed by a legislative enactment that sets forth a general framework for the adoption of EU soft law, core elements of which should be stipulations of subsidiarity vis-a-vis executive rulemaking and minimum procedural, transparency and justification requirements for the adoption of Commission soft law. Their domestic effects and reviewability should be clarified as well.