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Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (242)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Staatsrecht, Verwaltungsrecht und Europarecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Mario Martini) (2)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Stelkens) (2)
- Lehrstuhl für öffentliches Recht, insbesondere allgemeines und besonderes Verwaltungsrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Jan Ziekow) (2)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft und öffentliches Recht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hermann Hill) (1)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Finanz- und Steuerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Joachim Wieland) (1)
Der Kommentar von Brocker/Droege/Jutzi ist die hochgelobt erste Adresse bei allen Fragen zur Landesverfassung. Die Kommentierungen verdeutlichen insbesondere dort, wo das Landesverfassungsrecht Besonderheiten gegenüber dem Grundgesetz aufweist, die Eigen-ständigkeit der Verfassungsrechtsräume.
Die Neuauflage greift alle Neuerungen der Verfassungsreform, insbesondere im Wahlrechts-schutz (Nichtanerkennungsbeschwerde politischer Parteien und Wählervereinigungen) auf.
Komitologieverfahren
(2011)
Komitologieverfahren
(2016)
This introductory article makes the case for studying joint institutional frameworks (JIFs) in EU bilateral agreements and provides an overview of the remaining contributions to the sympo-sium. In doing so, it addresses contemporary policy developments and theoretical debates in political science and international institutional law. It considers the rationale, design, perfor-mance as well as legitimacy of JIFs both in general and, in particular, in the EU's contractual bilateral relations. By mapping out the variety of JIFs in distinct geographical and regulatory contexts, the article develops an overarching argument about the ‘transversal’ nature of such structural frameworks, focusing on the most prevalent structural principles and rules, joint bodies and special procedures, including those not covered in detail in the other contribu-tions to this symposium.
The introduction will describe the constant evolving global political context correlated to the events occurring, specifically, in the trade environment and the unprecedented challenges they pose for the EU Trade Policy. These identified and introduced challenges will be addressed in detail in the following book chapters. It will also introduce the reader to the individual contributions of the book and briefly present and anticipate the results attained.
Introduction
(2018)
EU administrative law scholarship and practice remain confused about the reach and interrelation of arts 290 and 291 TFEU, which created the categories of delegated and implementing Commission acts. The introduction of these two different instruments of executive rule-making by the Lisbon Treaty has prompted attempts in delineating them, based on constitutional theories of separation of powers or functional differentiation. These attempts have failed to a large extent, all the more since the CJEU’s relevant case law has not been helpful in constructing a proper distinction. Today, recourse to arts 290 and 291 TFEU by the legislator takes place in the tension created between the fact that the Treaties, informed by an abstract constitutional distinction between legislation and execution, appear to have created categorically different acts, and the fact that delegated and implementing rule-making procedures in practice have become increasingly similar to each other. In simplified terms, the problem is that delegated and implementing acts appear – in terms of their foundation in primary law – as fundamentally different acts that are, however, adopted in practice through similar procedures, at the same time as their content and legal effects are indistinguishable in many or even in most cases. Yet, if we accept that the creation of two forms of Commission acts was prompted by some form of legal necessity or legitimate political will, then understanding the difference between delegating and implementing acts remains paramount.
After the invocation of security exceptions became more common, the first panel report ever on how to apply them has recently been issued in the Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case. While this panel addressed the application of the security exception in a situation of threat to international peace and security, the question must be raised whether its approach also applies to the invocation of security exceptions for economic reasons. In this context, the present chapter focuses on the methodical preliminaries to applying security exceptions: Its application in WTO dispute settlement does not only prompt the question of the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, but also pertains to the issues of standard of proof and standard of review. A related methodical issue concerns the feasibility of the expansive interpretive approach applied to the general exceptions to the security exception. Reading it in the same tune runs the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether, even more so as the security exceptions miss the usual safeguard against abuse, i.e. the requirements of the general exceptions´ chapeau. The lack of such safety valve confirms that security exceptions are of a different character compared to other exceptions. This difference, however, may be difficult to maintain if security exceptions are also used to defend economic security interests. Finally, the application of security exceptions may - as debated with regard to other WTO exceptions - be subject to an inherent limitation against exterritorial application, which would restrain its scope of application in cases in which security measures against a third country intend to affect also the trade of WTO members, and could become relevant in assessing US sanctions against Iran.
Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU are notoriously hard to differentiate. However, there is some evidence that a separation on the basis of substantive regulation through delegated acts and procedural specifications by implementing acts is forthcoming. The substantive – procedural differentiation is not very clear cut, but it affords the institutions flexibility in answering new challenges while at the same time exerting some guiding force. This Conclusion describes the separation of delegated and implementing acts along the substantive – procedural differentiation but also points to problems ahead. Thus, constitutional ambiguity, an inappropriate reliance on pre-Lisbon doctrine and the lack of a common vision continue to plague the law on EU administrative rule-making. To find a way to fulfil the promise of simplification that is part of the Lisbon reform, the EU institutions will all need to take the procedural safeguards around delegated and implementing acts more seriously.
Grund- und Menschenrechte
(2008)
General Comparative Report
(2012)
Ex Officio Third Country Subsidies' Review: Similarities with and Differences to State Aid Procedure
(2022)
In May 2021 the European Commission tabled a draft Third Country Subsidies Regulation which stands between trade and competition policy. This new instrument establishes a review of third country subsidies with a view to addressing the competition distortion resulting from foreign subsidies granted to undertakings economically active in the EU internal market. As the new tool complements EU State aid scrutiny with a view to foreign subsidies, the present contribution compares the general procedures and provisions of the new regulation with EU State aid law. It will be shown that despite many similarities with State aid law, considerable differences remain which can be explained by looking at the different procedural and substantive context.
This chapter identifies the most pressing challenges for the EU multilaterally oriented trade policy due to the changing global context for international trade and investment, caused by the shift of the US towards unilateralism and protectionism and by the re-orientation of China´s exceptionalism towards becoming a more influential actor. It explores and assesses how EU trade policy copes with the new polarities and finally formulates proposals for the way forward for the EU multilateral trade policy. It will be shown that the current challenges are more fundamental in character and may last longer than currently anticipated. It will also highlight that maintaining unity in the EU determination of trade policy is of pivotal importance for addressing the challenges, which however might become more difficult.
Establisment
(2002)
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, trade policy has become an explicit part of the EU's external policy and integrated into the general framework of the EU´s external policy, but must also be in conformity with internal policies. Thus, trade policy is subject to a requirement of multiple coherence. Beyond constitutional obligations, other drivers work for the inclusion of non-genuine commercial policy objectives in trade policy, such as the orientation of contemporary trade politics towards the behind the border issues of national regulation, so that trade policy became closely intertwined with domestic regulatory policy. Therefore the actors primarily responsible for legislation, i.e. parliaments, advocate for their extended participation in determining trade policy, and rightly so for reasons of transparency, control and political inclusiveness. Parliaments thus become actors of respect for and positive consideration of non-commercial policy objectives in trade policy, which applies as well to the European Parliament (EP). Hence, an institutional design of policy formulation cycles and decision-making in EU trade policy that strives for better coherence of trade concerns with NTPOs must focus on strengthening the influence of the EP and improve its participatory rights in decision-making and its control and monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, the present paper derives proposals for improving EP´s monitoring mechanisms for the benefit of non-trade policy objectives (NTPOs) in trade policy from an analysis of weaknesses in the negotiation and implementation stage of trade policy.
Diskussionsbericht
(1999)
Der neue Verordnungsvorschlag der Kommission zu Drittlandssubventionen sieht eine Aufsicht durch die Europäische Kommission vor, die vergleichbar ist mit ihrer Aufsicht über staatliche Beihilfen. Dennoch bestehen erhebliche Unterschiede. Vorliegender Beitrag unternimmt einen Vergleich der Instrumente im Hinblick auf von Amts wegen eingeleitete Verfahren und analysiert Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in den Verfahren und den Untersuchungsbefugnissen.
Vorliegender Beitrag analysiert das CETA-Gutachten des EuGH 1/17, das in erstaunlich un-kritischer Betrachtung denkbarer Konflikte zwischen den Zuständigkeiten des CETA-Tribunals einerseits und denen des EuGH andererseits keine Einwände erkennen wollte. In ersten Reaktionen ist dieses Gutachten als Ausweitung des Bewegungsspielraums der EU im Bereich Investitionsschutz begrüßt worden. Jedenfalls das Investitionsgerichtssystem nach CETA ist indes nur mit gewissen Maßgaben unionskonform, die im Text des Gutachtens deutlich werden und geeignet sind, den Spielraum für die vertraglichen EU-Außen-beziehungen nicht unerheblich einzuengen. Diese vom EuGH an der Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung festgemachten Einschränkungen bilden wegen ihrer grundsätzlichen Bedeutung den zentralen Gegenstand vorliegender Betrachtung. Zunächst wird die Neu-akzentuierung der externen Autonomie des Unionsrechts im CETA Gutachten analysiert (II). Anschließend werden die Überlegungen des EuGH zur Abgrenzung seiner Zuständigkeiten von denen des CETA Tribunals kritisch beleuchtet. Die dabei zu beobachtende recht oberflächliche Analyse des EuGH steht im Gegensatz zum Herangehen des EuGH in früheren Entscheidungen, verkennt Problemstellungen und führt daher nur scheinbar zu einer sauberen Abgrenzbarkeit der Zuständigkeiten (III.). Dem folgt eine Betrachtung des letzten Teiles der Autonomieanalyse des EuGH, in der er sich der Kritik des regulatory chill zuwendet (IV). Hier formuliert der EuGH mit dem Abstellen auf die ungehinderte Funktion der EU-Organe gemäß ihrem verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmen die eben angesprochene neue Schranke für Investitionsschutzmechanismen, die die zuvor umfassend bejahte Zuständigkeit des CETA-Tribunals in einem Punkt zurücknimmt und die darüber hinaus viele Fragen nach ihrer konkreten Bedeutung und Konsequenz, aber auch nach ihrem Anwendungsbereich aufwirft. Abschließend wird angesichts der Dürftigkeit der Begründung des EuGH eine Rekonstruktion dieser Schranke unternommen, die die für eine Begründung maßgeblichen Ansätze aus dem Schutz der demokratischen Entscheidungsfreiheit in der EU entfaltet (V.).
Democratization of good global governance: The EU's role in the Parliamentarization of trade policy
(2022)
The quest for good governance in trade relations occurs against the backdrop of an increa-sing politicization of trade policy. In the new reality of global value chains and servitisation, regulating trade goes far beyond technical issues of reducing entrance barriers, border measures and tariffs, but becomes a comprehensive endeavour of scrutinizing and policing behind-the-border political issues. Therefore, a call for raising the legitimacy of trade policy formulation and implementation rises. Hence, parliamentarisation of trade policy is ever more necessary. The EU's constitutional development and its practice in trade policy is a good example for more parliamentary involvement, which strengthens trade policy's legi-timacy, transparency, and public awareness. Thus, the EU indeed is, despite all weaknesses,
a pacemaker and hence good global actor to the benefit of democratisation of global trade governance, being an essential factor of good governance.
Defining the EC Borders
(2003)