Refine
Document Type
- Public lecture (5)
- Article (1)
- Part of a Book (1)
Has Fulltext
- no (7) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (7)
Keywords
- Europapolitik (1)
- Interessengruppen (1)
- Ministerien (1)
- Netzwerke (1)
- Regulierung (1)
This chapter focuses on the impact of specific “administrative styles,” understood as the everyday routines of the organization, on the reform patterns in international organizations. Consolidators are hence primarily driven by positional rather than policy interests. Entre-preneurs combine the latter two types; they develop administrative routines that entail intensive bureaucratic advocacy in policy-making and a strong orientation toward institu-tional consolidation to strengthen the administration’s position. In contrast, the picture should be completely different for consolidators. Given consolidators’ dominant motivation to secure their institutional status and legitimacy, organizational reforms will to a far greater degree reveal patterns of emulation of dominant reform paradigms and reform ideas in their organizational environment. Public sector organizations adopted these reports from the private sector as a form of communication with external and internal stakeholders. Most reforms have been identified within the area of organizational reforms, for example, institutional adjustments of the directorates.
This article asks how and why United Nations organizations reform their administrative structure and processes over time. It explores whether we can observe a convergence towards a coherent administrative model in the United Nations system. Like in most nation states, reform discussions according to models like New Public Management or post-New Public Management have permeated international public administrations. Against this background, the question of administrative convergence discussed for national administra-tive systems also arises for United Nations international public administrations. On the one hand, similar challenges, common reform ‘fashions’ and an increasing exchange within the United Nations system make convergence likely. Yet, on the other hand, distinct tasks, administrative styles and path dependencies might support divergent reform trajectories. This question of convergence is addressed by measuring the frequency, direction and rationales for reforms, using a sample of four international public administrations from the United Nations’ specialized agencies (the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization, International Monetary Fund and World Bank). We find that conver-gence depends on the area of reform (human resources or organizational matters are more harmonized than others) and time (some international public administrations are faster or earlier than others).
Die Einbindung gesellschaftlicher Interessen in ministerielle Entscheidungen ist im Rahmen der governance-Forschung längst akzeptiert. Gesellschaftliche Interessen, dazu zählt die ganze Bandbreite der artikulierten und aggregierten Interessen, erhöhen nicht nur die Legitimität der ministeriellen Entscheidungen, sondern erweitern auch das Informations-spektrum der Behörden. Theoretisch begreifen insbesondere organisationsökonomische Ansätze diese Ergänzung durch gesellschaftliche Akteure als effizient. Demokratietheoretische Ansätze betonen hingegen die Herausforderungen transparenter und gleicher Betrachtung diverser Interessen.
Dieser Aufsatz vergleicht die ministeriellen Netzwerke in Deutschland, Niederlande, Schweden, und dem Vereinigten Königreich und versucht sich an der Einschätzung, welche Akteure, welche Informationen zu welcher Nützlichkeit für das Ministerium anbieten. Dazu greift das Papier auf knapp 100 Interviews mit nationalen Ministerien und ihren Kooperationsnetzwerken bezüglich verschiedene EU-Richtlinien zurück. Der Aufsatz stellt fest, dass die Integration und Betrachtung verschiedener gesellschaftlicher Interessen zwischen Politikfeld, Land und auch auf der policy-Ebene variiert. Weil die administrativen Prozesse zur Bildung und Nutzung dieser Netzwerke nur bedingt voneinander abweichen, fehlt es bis dato an einer Erklärung der Abweichungen.
The regulation of interest mediation in democratic, economic relevant countries has not been systematically analyzed in a big N-study so far (smaller exceptions are (Chari et al., 2010; Holman and Luneburg, 2012)). This is surprising since interest mediation itself, the integration of societal actors into the decision-making processes, has been studied from many different perspectives using varying methodological approaches (Reutter, 2012; Willems and von Winter, 2007; Beyers et al., 2008; Eising et al., 2017).
This paper starts with the assumption that each country has a distinct way of dealing with the interests in its society, ranging from social, environmental, religious to economic ones, just to name a few. Each democratic country has to decide, how and in which ways societal interests are integrated into decision-making and which rules apply for these processes.
Existing research in interest mediation in general has in common that the concept of institutions helps us to map similarities as well as differences in the system of interest mediation. Institutions are understood as man-made, formalized (written) or non-formalized (unwritten) common conceptions or understandings of how power and other resources are distributed and exerted, how competences and responsibilities are defined, shaped and shared, as well as how interdependencies are structured (Morisse-Schilbach, 2012; March and Olsen, 1989; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995).
The paper offers a conceptual framework to map the existing institutions relevant for regulating interest mediation in OECD countries to help understand the qualitative similarities and differences. To do so, it looks at formalized (written) or non-formalized (unwritten) rules, in terms of laws and by-laws, administrative procedures, and patterns of practices. The aim is to measure a) the openness of the interest mediation system in terms of equal access for all societal interests, and b) the level of formalized and non-formalized regulation to arrive at a typology of either open or closed as well as regulated or unregulated interest mediation systems.