Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Part of a Book (28)
- Article (27)
- Public lecture (5)
- Book (4)
- Contribution to a Periodical (4)
- Review (4)
- Conference Proceeding (2)
- Working Paper (1)
Language
- English (75) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (75)
Keywords
- Europäische Union (4)
- Verwaltungsrecht (3)
- EU (2)
- Europäischen Union (2)
- Zollunion (2)
- delegated acts (2)
- differentiation (2)
- implementing acts (2)
- ACCC (1)
- Aarhus convention (1)
Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (75) (remove)
The Union legislator has recently amended the Aarhus Regulation with the aim of bringing it more in line with the requirements the Aarhus Convention lays down. EU State aid decisions, however, remain excluded from its scope. This exclusion raises questions that form the object of this contribution. The article argues that the arguments presented to justify the continued exclusion of State aid review are not convincing. By not complying with the re-commendations of the ACCC, the EU is in clear violation of international law. Therefore, the article deliberates over the necessary changes and possible exemptions for a sound im-plementation of the Aarhus Convention against the procedural specificities of State aid review, considering also the Commission´s recently presented options, which contain a number of problematic aspects.
This introductory article makes the case for studying joint institutional frameworks (JIFs) in EU bilateral agreements and provides an overview of the remaining contributions to the sympo-sium. In doing so, it addresses contemporary policy developments and theoretical debates in political science and international institutional law. It considers the rationale, design, perfor-mance as well as legitimacy of JIFs both in general and, in particular, in the EU's contractual bilateral relations. By mapping out the variety of JIFs in distinct geographical and regulatory contexts, the article develops an overarching argument about the ‘transversal’ nature of such structural frameworks, focusing on the most prevalent structural principles and rules, joint bodies and special procedures, including those not covered in detail in the other contribu-tions to this symposium.
Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.
The introduction will describe the constant evolving global political context correlated to the events occurring, specifically, in the trade environment and the unprecedented challenges they pose for the EU Trade Policy. These identified and introduced challenges will be addressed in detail in the following book chapters. It will also introduce the reader to the individual contributions of the book and briefly present and anticipate the results attained.
General Comparative Report
(2012)
Biofuels and WTO Law
(2011)
Defining the EC Borders
(2003)
Establisment
(2002)
The book explores the impact of WTO law on domestic regulatory autonomy. It identifies and critically analyses the mechanisms working in WTO law that cause increasing interferences with domestic law and thus restrain the regulatory autonomy of the WTO members. The book proposes ways how WTO law be conceptualized to enhance the policy space of WTO members. Therefore, the book demonstrates the flexibilities in interpreting and applying WTO core principles and provisions and explores interpretive and institutional conceptions that could serve as a pathway of allocating greater policy leeway to WTO members.
The analyses presented address the disturbing observation that even though WTO law appreciates the regulatory leeway of WTO members in several provisions across agreements, the WTO judiciary´s case law, but also other governance mechanism active in the WTO appear to narrow down the WTO members´ regulatory autonomy and to considerably limit the space for domestic policy choices. Wide spread, even scholarly perception of the WTO, and most recently the Trump administration blame the WTO, in particular its dispute settlement branch, for being biased towards free trade and unduly restraining even legitimate domestic policies, and voiding the domestic policy space needed for addressing societal concerns and global problems. A closer look at the development of GATT/WTO law, however, reveals that, in GATT era, panels were aware of the effect their interpretations had on domestic policy space, and that some of the more recent WTO dispute settlement reports show attempts to expand WTO member´s leeway again. These observations are the starting point for an indepth analysis of the different mechanisms present in WTO law which impact on domestic regulation.
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, trade policy has become an explicit part of the EU's external policy and integrated into the general framework of the EU´s external policy, but must also be in conformity with internal policies. Thus, trade policy is subject to a requirement of multiple coherence. Beyond constitutional obligations, other drivers work for the inclusion of non-genuine commercial policy objectives in trade policy, such as the orientation of contemporary trade politics towards the behind the border issues of national regulation, so that trade policy became closely intertwined with domestic regulatory policy. Therefore the actors primarily responsible for legislation, i.e. parliaments, advocate for their extended participation in determining trade policy, and rightly so for reasons of transparency, control and political inclusiveness. Parliaments thus become actors of respect for and positive consideration of non-commercial policy objectives in trade policy, which applies as well to the European Parliament (EP). Hence, an institutional design of policy formulation cycles and decision-making in EU trade policy that strives for better coherence of trade concerns with NTPOs must focus on strengthening the influence of the EP and improve its participatory rights in decision-making and its control and monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, the present paper derives proposals for improving EP´s monitoring mechanisms for the benefit of non-trade policy objectives (NTPOs) in trade policy from an analysis of weaknesses in the negotiation and implementation stage of trade policy.
The European Commission presented, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, scenarios on the future of the EU in 2025, which prompt the question as to their meaning for the future of EU administrative law. This article explores the implications of the scenarios for the future of EU executive rulemaking and its constitutional consequences. As some scenarios imply a more powerful political role of the Commission, and almost all expand the scope and usage of executive rulemaking, the executive power gains induce the need for more distinct constitutional guidelines for executive rulemaking and for strengthened parliamentary control, to preserve the institutional power balance between legislative and executive rulemaking. The analysis develops proposals insofar and demands respect for constitutional barriers already enshrined in EU primary law but not sufficiently addressed yet in institutional practice.
As WTO members increasingly invoke security exceptions and the first panel report insofar was issued in Russia-Traffic in Transit, the methodical and procedural preliminaries of their adjudication must be reassessed. The preliminaries pertain to justiciability and to the proper interpretive approach for their vague terms that seemingly imply considerable discretion to WTO members, all the more as general exceptions are subject to expansive interpretation. Reading security exceptions expansively appears not viable as they miss the usual safeguard against abuse (i.e. the chapeau of Arts XX GATT/XIV GATS). This lack of safeguards rather suggests caution in conceptualising them expansively, as do the systemic consequences of recent attempts to re-politicise security exceptions which run the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether. Furthermore, the appropriate standards of review and proof must be explored which have to strike a balance between control and deference in national security.
The present contribution analyses the Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU on CETA, which, in a surprisingly uncritical view of conceivable conflicts between the competences of the CETA Investment Tribunal on the one hand and those of the CJEU on the other hand, did not raise any objections. In first reactions, this opinion was welcomed as an extension of the EU's room for manoeuvre in investment protection. The investment court system under CETA, however, is only compatible with EU law to a certain extent, which the Court made clear in the text of the opinion, and the restrictions are likely to confine the leeway for EU external contractual relations. Due to their fundamental importance, these restrictions, derived by the CJEU from the autonomy of the Union legal order form the core subject of this contribution. In what follows, the new emphasis in the CETA opinion on the external autonomy of Union law will be analyzed first (II). Subsequently, the considerations of the CJEU on the delimitation of its competences from those of the CETA Tribunal will be critically examined. The rather superficial analysis of the CJEU in the CETA opinion is in contrast to its approach in earlier decisions as it misjudges problems and therefore only superficially leads to a clear delimitation of competences (III.). An exploration of the last part of the CJEU's autonomy analysis will follow, in which the CJEU tries to respond to the criticism of regulatory chill (IV). Here, by referring to the unhindered operation of the EU institutions in accordance with their constitutional framework, the CJEU identifies the new restrictions for investment protection mechanisms just mentioned, which takes back the previous comprehensive affirmation of jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal in one point and which raises many questions about its concrete significance, consequence, and scope of application.
Mixed agreements have been a preferred form of entering into international treaties chosen by the EU and its Member States, despite the complexities their usage implies. Recent attempts of the EU institutions to prefer the conclusion of EU only agreements to mixed agreements, as a consequence of the broad interpretation of EU exclusive trade competences by the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 are motivated by the hope for increased efficiency in EU treaty making. They, however, provoke criticism with regard to democratic legitimacy and the EU principle of conferral, which constrain the EU to adopt only those legal acts for which it is competent. As this criticism is particularly strong in Germany and led to constitutional challenges of EU only acts, the present contribution will explain the treatment of mixed agreements in the constitutional order of Germany and explore the constitutional challenges that EU only agreements pose to the German constitutional order. This discussion will thus show the German legal order’s continued preference for mixed agreements, in view of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Those constitutional challenges are particularly topical in view of the most recent case law of the CJEU that stressed the political leeway of the EU Council to choose, when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of EU agreements based on shard competences, between either an EU only agreement or a mixed agreement. This political leeway turns mixity into a facultative endeavour in the hands of the Council. Under the constitutional perceptions of the FCC, such type of facultative mixity meets with considerable constitutional concerns because it replaces what was formerly held obligatory mixity.
This chapter identifies the most pressing challenges for the EU multilaterally oriented trade policy due to the changing global context for international trade and investment, caused by the shift of the US towards unilateralism and protectionism and by the re-orientation of China´s exceptionalism towards becoming a more influential actor. It explores and assesses how EU trade policy copes with the new polarities and finally formulates proposals for the way forward for the EU multilateral trade policy. It will be shown that the current challenges are more fundamental in character and may last longer than currently anticipated. It will also highlight that maintaining unity in the EU determination of trade policy is of pivotal importance for addressing the challenges, which however might become more difficult.
After the invocation of security exceptions became more common, the first panel report ever on how to apply them has recently been issued in the Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case. While this panel addressed the application of the security exception in a situation of threat to international peace and security, the question must be raised whether its approach also applies to the invocation of security exceptions for economic reasons. In this context, the present chapter focuses on the methodical preliminaries to applying security exceptions: Its application in WTO dispute settlement does not only prompt the question of the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, but also pertains to the issues of standard of proof and standard of review. A related methodical issue concerns the feasibility of the expansive interpretive approach applied to the general exceptions to the security exception. Reading it in the same tune runs the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether, even more so as the security exceptions miss the usual safeguard against abuse, i.e. the requirements of the general exceptions´ chapeau. The lack of such safety valve confirms that security exceptions are of a different character compared to other exceptions. This difference, however, may be difficult to maintain if security exceptions are also used to defend economic security interests. Finally, the application of security exceptions may - as debated with regard to other WTO exceptions - be subject to an inherent limitation against exterritorial application, which would restrain its scope of application in cases in which security measures against a third country intend to affect also the trade of WTO members, and could become relevant in assessing US sanctions against Iran.