Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (105) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (105)
Keywords
- Europäische Union (2)
- ACCC (1)
- Aarhus convention (1)
- Aarhus regulation (1)
- Artt. 290 & 291 AEUV (1)
- Binnenmarkt (1)
- Europäische Atomgemeinschaft (1)
- Hinkley Point C (1)
- Internationale Organisationen (1)
- Jugendschutz (1)
- Rundfunkübertragung (1)
- Verfassungsrecht (1)
- Zollunion (1)
- internal review (1)
Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (105) (remove)
Durch die Konferenz zur Zukunft Europas hat die Debatte um eine Reform des EU-Primär-rechts neue Fahrt aufgenommen. Eine Vertragsreform tut not, im Interesse effektiverer, aber auch demokratischerer Beschlussfassung, erweiterter Kompetenzen und konsentierter Ver-bundgrundlagen zur Bewältigung der zahlreichen äußeren und inneren Herausforderungen.
Umsetzung und Durchsetzung der EU-Handelspolitik: Neue Entwicklungen der „Open Strategic Autonomy“
(2020)
Die Europäische Kommission legt seit einiger Zeit eine stärkere Betonung auf die Verbesserung der Um- und Durchsetzung der Handelsregeln. Aktuell zeichnet sich dies in einer Fülle von Vorhaben und Initiativen ab, die sich auch in die projektierte Erneuerung der Handelspolitik unter dem Leitbild der „offenen strategischen Autonomie“ einfügen. Der Beitrag untersucht die neuen Entwicklungen auf institutioneller, prätorischer und legislativer Ebene.
The European Commission presented, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, scenarios on the future of the EU in 2025, which prompt the question as to their meaning for the future of EU administrative law. This article explores the implications of the scenarios for the future of EU executive rulemaking and its constitutional consequences. As some scenarios imply a more powerful political role of the Commission, and almost all expand the scope and usage of executive rulemaking, the executive power gains induce the need for more distinct constitutional guidelines for executive rulemaking and for strengthened parliamentary control, to preserve the institutional power balance between legislative and executive rulemaking. The analysis develops proposals insofar and demands respect for constitutional barriers already enshrined in EU primary law but not sufficiently addressed yet in institutional practice.
Trade relations face unprecedented challenges, which has led to an increased politicisation and contestation of trade rules. In response, the EU has changed its trade policy under the motto ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ towards a more as-sertive policy. The EU seeks to signifi-cantly expand its room of manoeuvre and to gain more autonomy by strengthening the en-forcement of its trade rights and by ensuring more effectively, including unilaterally, a level playing field. This re-orientation engenders several new or amended trade policy instru-ments, but meets with reservations as the renewed politicisation of EU trade policy will have internal consequences and raise demands for more democratic accountability of the Euro-pean Commission. The new policy instruments will enlarge its leeway in trade policy. The future of the EU's multilateral, rule- instead of power-oriented political stance becomes unclear, which might undermine its negotiation posi-tion in WTO reform and collide with the EU's respect for international law. The tensions of the EU's new hybrid approach with its international commitments even more fuel demands for increased accountability of the Commission as a safeguard against employing the new powers for protectionism and disrespect to international law. The contribution analyses the need for increased Commis-sion accountability in the redirected trade policy.
The TCA (EU-UK Trade and Copperation Agreement) establishes a very comprehensive institutional framework with Partnership Council and diverse Committees having partly substantial decision-making powers for the development of the TCA. These considerable public functions prompt legitimacy concerns as to their democratic control, which this article explores in detail. It will be shown that the exercise of public powers by TCA treaty bodies meets with a sobering legal situation regarding democratic control mechanisms over treaty body decision-making at different levels. Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the legal and legitimate transfer of powers requires additional safeguards as to their democratic legitimacy. Solutions for better control of treaty body decisions by parliaments must be developed at several levels simultaneously.
Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.
The Union legislator has recently amended the Aarhus Regulation with the aim of bringing it more in line with the requirements the Aarhus Convention lays down. EU State aid decisions, however, remain excluded from its scope. This exclusion raises questions that form the object of this contribution. The article argues that the arguments presented to justify the continued exclusion of State aid review are not convincing. By not complying with the re-commendations of the ACCC, the EU is in clear violation of international law. Therefore, the article deliberates over the necessary changes and possible exemptions for a sound im-plementation of the Aarhus Convention against the procedural specificities of State aid review, considering also the Commission´s recently presented options, which contain a number of problematic aspects.
Searching for Order. Exploring the use of delegated and implementing acts in the EU customs code
(2017)
Artikel über Unterschiede in der gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigung der Kommission unter Art. 290 AEUV gegenüber Art. 291 AEUV anhand des EU Zollkode. Der Artikel findet empirische Unterschiede insofern als Art. 290 AEUV für die Ermächtigung der Festsetzung von 'Bedingungen' verwendet wird, und Art. 291 AEUV für die Ermächtigung zur Festsetzung von Verfahrensregeln.
This article takes the proliferation of EU soft law instruments in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to analyse their effects and challenges to democracy and rule of law in the EU posed by the use of EU soft law in the implementation of EU law. A proposal will be made for a general legal framework on the adoption of administrative EU soft law in order to address them. Enhancing the legitimacy of EU governance requires a general legal framework that introduces minimum procedural, transparency and participa-tory safeguards and foresees looser rules for urgent soft measures. The article thus makes an original contribution by reconsidering the debate about EU soft law in the context of COVID-19 soft law with a view to its salience for domestic implementation of EU law and by developing core elements of a general legal framework.
This introductory article makes the case for studying joint institutional frameworks (JIFs) in EU bilateral agreements and provides an overview of the remaining contributions to the sympo-sium. In doing so, it addresses contemporary policy developments and theoretical debates in political science and international institutional law. It considers the rationale, design, perfor-mance as well as legitimacy of JIFs both in general and, in particular, in the EU's contractual bilateral relations. By mapping out the variety of JIFs in distinct geographical and regulatory contexts, the article develops an overarching argument about the ‘transversal’ nature of such structural frameworks, focusing on the most prevalent structural principles and rules, joint bodies and special procedures, including those not covered in detail in the other contribu-tions to this symposium.