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Two different States licensed exports of intrusion tools and related items to a third State. That State then used it to spy on human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, activists, opposition politicians, and dissidents. While one of the licensing States is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the other is not but had declared to follow it unilaterally. The legal analysis considers the attribution of the relevant acts and omissions by the States and examines possible breaches of international export control law and international human rights law.
To contribute to the laudable objectives regarding Export Controls the EU – US Trade and Technology Council has set, a multi-disciplinary network of independent experts from research institutes, think tanks, and policy advisory bodies, has joined forces and drafted the following priorities for action.
A further elaboration of the actions recommended below will be performed by the members of this international network in the weeks and months to come, as Working Group 7 of the EU – US Trade and Technology Council will proceed in its work.
Der moderne Krieg verwandelt sich mehr und mehr zu einem digitalen Schlachtfeld: Die Innovationen reichen von autonomen Waffensystemen über digitale Kommandostrukturen bis hin zu Cyberwaffen. Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Militärtechnologien sowie ihr höhe-res Maß an Autonomie gehen Hand in Hand mit einem erhöhten Risiko für internationalen Frieden und Sicherheit. Oft können diese Technologien als sog. Dual Use Güter aber auch zivil genutzt und global gehandelt werden. Sie bergen neben Risiken also ebenfalls ein Potenzial für die internationale wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Wie aber lässt sich verhindern, dass digitale Dual-Use Güter in die falschen Hände geraten, wie z. B. an diktatorische Regime oder Terroristen? Und ist es möglich, dabei einen fairen Ausgleich zwischen internationaler Sicherheit und internationaler Entwicklung herzustellen?
Die Europäische Kommission unterbreitete 2016 einen Gesetzesvorschlag, um die in die Jahre gekommene Dual-Use Verordnung von 2009 zu reformieren. Die Verordnung reguliert den Export von Gütern, die sowohl zivilen als auch militärischen Zwecken dienen können. Ziel war es, die Exportkontrollvorgaben an neue Herausforderungen anzupassen, wie sie sich aus der Verwendung von digitalen Technologien durch oppressive Regime ergeben.
Die Verhandlung zwischen der Kommission, dem Parlament und den EU-Staaten war wegen des Widerstands einiger Länder, darunter Deutschland, ins Stocken geraten. Insbesondere drei Faktoren sind dabei ins Rampenlicht gerückt: Die Wahrung von Menschenrechten, die Wahrung europäischer Sicherheitsinteressen und die Interessen der Exportwirtschaft. Nun soll noch dieses Jahr ein Kompromisstext verabschiedet werden.
Wir möchten besprechen, wie die geostrategischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen einerseits und der Schutz von Menschenrechten andererseits in Einklang gebracht werden können und welche Rolle die EU global in diesem Bereich einnimmt.
Digital technologies often have a dual-use nature, which means they can be used for both civil and military purposes. For instance, object recognition software can be used for auto-nomous civil driving or for autonomous targeting within armed drones. Thus, their uncon-trolled proliferation may pose risks to international peace and security. Generally, export controls aim to mitigate these risks while avoiding unreasonable restrictions on global trade and development. The novelty of digital dual-use items and the dynamics of their transfer pose new challenges for the international export control system and raise critical legal questions under international law. Does international law hold export control rules that sufficiently address the broad spectrum of relevant digital dual-use items and their rapid technological advancement? Furthermore, how do these rules treat the digital transfer of such items?
The presentation aims to answer these questions by, first, carving out the relevant inter-national export control rules. Secondly, the application of these rules to the digital dual-use items and their international transfer is analyzed. Finally, to the extent that the applicability is affirmed, the presentation will examine the international export control law’s requirements to the international transfer of digital dual-use items.
For centuries, export control regulations have accompanied the development of new weapon technologies. The revelations of the ‘Pegasus Project’ have put the question of whether and how to regulate the export of the new technology ‘cyberweapons’ in the limelight: Is the current international export control law up to the challenge of sufficiently regulating the proliferation of ‘cyberweapons’ or does it need an update? To answer this question, the blog post will, first, turn to the definition and relevance of ‘cyberweapons’. Secondly, international export control law is introduced as a possible measure to mitigate the risks posed by ‘cyberweapons’ against the backdrop of regulating the use of ‘cyberweapons’ or establishing a moratorium on its trade. Third, the blog post will assess the export of ‘cyberweapons’ in general and the export of Pegasus in particular within the current international export control framework. The current framework seems to touch upon partial aspects of the trade with ‘cyberweapons’. However, it stands to fear that it is not up to the task of sufficiently curtailing the proliferation of ‘cyberweapons’ and the associated risks, as it especially leaves the underlying problem of the trade with zero-day vulnerabilities untouched.