Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Part of a Book (28) (remove)
Language
- English (28) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (28)
Keywords
- EU (2)
- Europäische Union (2)
- Verwaltungsrecht (2)
- delegated acts (2)
- differentiation (2)
- implementing acts (2)
Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (28) (remove)
Mixed agreements have been a preferred form of entering into international treaties chosen by the EU and its Member States, despite the complexities their usage implies. Recent attempts of the EU institutions to prefer the conclusion of EU only agreements to mixed agreements, as a consequence of the broad interpretation of EU exclusive trade competences by the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 are motivated by the hope for increased efficiency in EU treaty making. They, however, provoke criticism with regard to democratic legitimacy and the EU principle of conferral, which constrain the EU to adopt only those legal acts for which it is competent. As this criticism is particularly strong in Germany and led to constitutional challenges of EU only acts, the present contribution will explain the treatment of mixed agreements in the constitutional order of Germany and explore the constitutional challenges that EU only agreements pose to the German constitutional order. This discussion will thus show the German legal order’s continued preference for mixed agreements, in view of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Those constitutional challenges are particularly topical in view of the most recent case law of the CJEU that stressed the political leeway of the EU Council to choose, when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of EU agreements based on shard competences, between either an EU only agreement or a mixed agreement. This political leeway turns mixity into a facultative endeavour in the hands of the Council. Under the constitutional perceptions of the FCC, such type of facultative mixity meets with considerable constitutional concerns because it replaces what was formerly held obligatory mixity.
The present contribution analyses the Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU on CETA, which, in a surprisingly uncritical view of conceivable conflicts between the competences of the CETA Investment Tribunal on the one hand and those of the CJEU on the other hand, did not raise any objections. In first reactions, this opinion was welcomed as an extension of the EU's room for manoeuvre in investment protection. The investment court system under CETA, however, is only compatible with EU law to a certain extent, which the Court made clear in the text of the opinion, and the restrictions are likely to confine the leeway for EU external contractual relations. Due to their fundamental importance, these restrictions, derived by the CJEU from the autonomy of the Union legal order form the core subject of this contribution. In what follows, the new emphasis in the CETA opinion on the external autonomy of Union law will be analyzed first (II). Subsequently, the considerations of the CJEU on the delimitation of its competences from those of the CETA Tribunal will be critically examined. The rather superficial analysis of the CJEU in the CETA opinion is in contrast to its approach in earlier decisions as it misjudges problems and therefore only superficially leads to a clear delimitation of competences (III.). An exploration of the last part of the CJEU's autonomy analysis will follow, in which the CJEU tries to respond to the criticism of regulatory chill (IV). Here, by referring to the unhindered operation of the EU institutions in accordance with their constitutional framework, the CJEU identifies the new restrictions for investment protection mechanisms just mentioned, which takes back the previous comprehensive affirmation of jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal in one point and which raises many questions about its concrete significance, consequence, and scope of application.
The introduction will describe the constant evolving global political context correlated to the events occurring, specifically, in the trade environment and the unprecedented challenges they pose for the EU Trade Policy. These identified and introduced challenges will be addressed in detail in the following book chapters. It will also introduce the reader to the individual contributions of the book and briefly present and anticipate the results attained.
Introduction
(2018)
EU administrative law scholarship and practice remain confused about the reach and interrelation of arts 290 and 291 TFEU, which created the categories of delegated and implementing Commission acts. The introduction of these two different instruments of executive rule-making by the Lisbon Treaty has prompted attempts in delineating them, based on constitutional theories of separation of powers or functional differentiation. These attempts have failed to a large extent, all the more since the CJEU’s relevant case law has not been helpful in constructing a proper distinction. Today, recourse to arts 290 and 291 TFEU by the legislator takes place in the tension created between the fact that the Treaties, informed by an abstract constitutional distinction between legislation and execution, appear to have created categorically different acts, and the fact that delegated and implementing rule-making procedures in practice have become increasingly similar to each other. In simplified terms, the problem is that delegated and implementing acts appear – in terms of their foundation in primary law – as fundamentally different acts that are, however, adopted in practice through similar procedures, at the same time as their content and legal effects are indistinguishable in many or even in most cases. Yet, if we accept that the creation of two forms of Commission acts was prompted by some form of legal necessity or legitimate political will, then understanding the difference between delegating and implementing acts remains paramount.
After the invocation of security exceptions became more common, the first panel report ever on how to apply them has recently been issued in the Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case. While this panel addressed the application of the security exception in a situation of threat to international peace and security, the question must be raised whether its approach also applies to the invocation of security exceptions for economic reasons. In this context, the present chapter focuses on the methodical preliminaries to applying security exceptions: Its application in WTO dispute settlement does not only prompt the question of the jurisdiction of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, but also pertains to the issues of standard of proof and standard of review. A related methodical issue concerns the feasibility of the expansive interpretive approach applied to the general exceptions to the security exception. Reading it in the same tune runs the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether, even more so as the security exceptions miss the usual safeguard against abuse, i.e. the requirements of the general exceptions´ chapeau. The lack of such safety valve confirms that security exceptions are of a different character compared to other exceptions. This difference, however, may be difficult to maintain if security exceptions are also used to defend economic security interests. Finally, the application of security exceptions may - as debated with regard to other WTO exceptions - be subject to an inherent limitation against exterritorial application, which would restrain its scope of application in cases in which security measures against a third country intend to affect also the trade of WTO members, and could become relevant in assessing US sanctions against Iran.
Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU are notoriously hard to differentiate. However, there is some evidence that a separation on the basis of substantive regulation through delegated acts and procedural specifications by implementing acts is forthcoming. The substantive – procedural differentiation is not very clear cut, but it affords the institutions flexibility in answering new challenges while at the same time exerting some guiding force. This Conclusion describes the separation of delegated and implementing acts along the substantive – procedural differentiation but also points to problems ahead. Thus, constitutional ambiguity, an inappropriate reliance on pre-Lisbon doctrine and the lack of a common vision continue to plague the law on EU administrative rule-making. To find a way to fulfil the promise of simplification that is part of the Lisbon reform, the EU institutions will all need to take the procedural safeguards around delegated and implementing acts more seriously.