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The book explores the impact of WTO law on domestic regulatory autonomy. It identifies and critically analyses the mechanisms working in WTO law that cause increasing interferences with domestic law and thus restrain the regulatory autonomy of the WTO members. The book proposes ways how WTO law be conceptualized to enhance the policy space of WTO members. Therefore, the book demonstrates the flexibilities in interpreting and applying WTO core principles and provisions and explores interpretive and institutional conceptions that could serve as a pathway of allocating greater policy leeway to WTO members.
The analyses presented address the disturbing observation that even though WTO law appreciates the regulatory leeway of WTO members in several provisions across agreements, the WTO judiciary´s case law, but also other governance mechanism active in the WTO appear to narrow down the WTO members´ regulatory autonomy and to considerably limit the space for domestic policy choices. Wide spread, even scholarly perception of the WTO, and most recently the Trump administration blame the WTO, in particular its dispute settlement branch, for being biased towards free trade and unduly restraining even legitimate domestic policies, and voiding the domestic policy space needed for addressing societal concerns and global problems. A closer look at the development of GATT/WTO law, however, reveals that, in GATT era, panels were aware of the effect their interpretations had on domestic policy space, and that some of the more recent WTO dispute settlement reports show attempts to expand WTO member´s leeway again. These observations are the starting point for an indepth analysis of the different mechanisms present in WTO law which impact on domestic regulation.
Mixed agreements have been a preferred form of entering into international treaties chosen by the EU and its Member States, despite the complexities their usage implies. Recent attempts of the EU institutions to prefer the conclusion of EU only agreements to mixed agreements, as a consequence of the broad interpretation of EU exclusive trade competences by the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 are motivated by the hope for increased efficiency in EU treaty making. They, however, provoke criticism with regard to democratic legitimacy and the EU principle of conferral, which constrain the EU to adopt only those legal acts for which it is competent. As this criticism is particularly strong in Germany and led to constitutional challenges of EU only acts, the present contribution will explain the treatment of mixed agreements in the constitutional order of Germany and explore the constitutional challenges that EU only agreements pose to the German constitutional order. This discussion will thus show the German legal order’s continued preference for mixed agreements, in view of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Those constitutional challenges are particularly topical in view of the most recent case law of the CJEU that stressed the political leeway of the EU Council to choose, when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of EU agreements based on shard competences, between either an EU only agreement or a mixed agreement. This political leeway turns mixity into a facultative endeavour in the hands of the Council. Under the constitutional perceptions of the FCC, such type of facultative mixity meets with considerable constitutional concerns because it replaces what was formerly held obligatory mixity.
The European Commission presented, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, scenarios on the future of the EU in 2025, which prompt the question as to their meaning for the future of EU administrative law. This article explores the implications of the scenarios for the future of EU executive rulemaking and its constitutional consequences. As some scenarios imply a more powerful political role of the Commission, and almost all expand the scope and usage of executive rulemaking, the executive power gains induce the need for more distinct constitutional guidelines for executive rulemaking and for strengthened parliamentary control, to preserve the institutional power balance between legislative and executive rulemaking. The analysis develops proposals insofar and demands respect for constitutional barriers already enshrined in EU primary law but not sufficiently addressed yet in institutional practice.
Trade relations face unprecedented challenges, which has led to an increased politicisation and contestation of trade rules. In response, the EU has changed its trade policy under the motto ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ towards a more as-sertive policy. The EU seeks to signifi-cantly expand its room of manoeuvre and to gain more autonomy by strengthening the en-forcement of its trade rights and by ensuring more effectively, including unilaterally, a level playing field. This re-orientation engenders several new or amended trade policy instru-ments, but meets with reservations as the renewed politicisation of EU trade policy will have internal consequences and raise demands for more democratic accountability of the Euro-pean Commission. The new policy instruments will enlarge its leeway in trade policy. The future of the EU's multilateral, rule- instead of power-oriented political stance becomes unclear, which might undermine its negotiation posi-tion in WTO reform and collide with the EU's respect for international law. The tensions of the EU's new hybrid approach with its international commitments even more fuel demands for increased accountability of the Commission as a safeguard against employing the new powers for protectionism and disrespect to international law. The contribution analyses the need for increased Commis-sion accountability in the redirected trade policy.
The TCA (EU-UK Trade and Copperation Agreement) establishes a very comprehensive institutional framework with Partnership Council and diverse Committees having partly substantial decision-making powers for the development of the TCA. These considerable public functions prompt legitimacy concerns as to their democratic control, which this article explores in detail. It will be shown that the exercise of public powers by TCA treaty bodies meets with a sobering legal situation regarding democratic control mechanisms over treaty body decision-making at different levels. Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the legal and legitimate transfer of powers requires additional safeguards as to their democratic legitimacy. Solutions for better control of treaty body decisions by parliaments must be developed at several levels simultaneously.
Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.