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Institute
- Lehrstuhl für Sozialrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaft (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Constanze Janda) (17)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Staatsrecht, Verwaltungsrecht und Europarecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Mario Martini) (8)
- Lehrstuhl für Verwaltungswissenschaft und öffentliches Recht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hermann Hill) (6)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere Europarecht und Völkerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Weiß) (5)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliche Betriebswirtschaftslehre (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Holger Mühlenkamp) (4)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Finanz- und Steuerrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Joachim Wieland) (3)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Staatslehre und Rechtsvergleichung (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Karl-Peter Sommermann) (3)
- Lehrstuhl für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsmanagement (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael Hölscher) (2)
- Lehrstuhl für Politikwissenschaft (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stephan Grohs) (1)
- Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, insbesondere deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Stelkens) (1)
Ärzte auf dem Prüfstand
(2010)
§ 9 Arzneimittelrecht
(2013)
§ 9 Arzneimittelrecht
(2020)
Wahl ohne Auswahl
(2003)
1. Das unbekannte Wesen "Wahlrecht"
2. Starre Wahllisten entmündigen die Wähler
3. Wahl durch die Hintertür
4. In Parteihochburgen: Diktat der Parteien
5. Die meisten sind in Wahrheit schon."gewählt"
6. Zur Methodik
7. Fatale Konsequenzen
8. Volksvertretung ohne Volk - Parlament ohne Legitimation
9. Reformen sind überfällig
Administrative justice and the rule of law have often been in tension. However, they have converged over time as the scope of administrative justice and the conceptions of the rule of law have shifted. This chapter starts with the historical connections between administrative justice and the rule of law. It then maps ways in which the rule of law is expressed when ad-ministrative justice is embedded within administrative organization and when it is organized as a system external to the administration. This approach highlights the diversity of technical solutions to recurring questions across three major administrative systems (namely England, France, and the United States). This analysis also leads to highlighting two new challenges for the rule of law: first, how the rule of law responds to various forms of increasing administra-tive repression, and second, how the rule of law responds to globalization at a time when no coherent global administrative justice system exists.
Mixed agreements have been a preferred form of entering into international treaties chosen by the EU and its Member States, despite the complexities their usage implies. Recent attempts of the EU institutions to prefer the conclusion of EU only agreements to mixed agreements, as a consequence of the broad interpretation of EU exclusive trade competences by the CJEU in Opinion 2/15 are motivated by the hope for increased efficiency in EU treaty making. They, however, provoke criticism with regard to democratic legitimacy and the EU principle of conferral, which constrain the EU to adopt only those legal acts for which it is competent. As this criticism is particularly strong in Germany and led to constitutional challenges of EU only acts, the present contribution will explain the treatment of mixed agreements in the constitutional order of Germany and explore the constitutional challenges that EU only agreements pose to the German constitutional order. This discussion will thus show the German legal order’s continued preference for mixed agreements, in view of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Those constitutional challenges are particularly topical in view of the most recent case law of the CJEU that stressed the political leeway of the EU Council to choose, when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of EU agreements based on shard competences, between either an EU only agreement or a mixed agreement. This political leeway turns mixity into a facultative endeavour in the hands of the Council. Under the constitutional perceptions of the FCC, such type of facultative mixity meets with considerable constitutional concerns because it replaces what was formerly held obligatory mixity.
The landmark judgment in the case of Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France, which concerned the execution of a European arrest warrant, provides a good illustration of the effects of the Con-vention liability of EU Member States for their implementation of EU law. These effects touch on such notions as cooperation, trust, complementarity, autonomy and responsibility. The two European courts have been cooperating towards some convergence of the standards applicable to the handling of EAWs. The Bosphorus presumption and its application in Bivo-laru and Moldovan show the amount of trust placed by the Strasbourg Court in the EU pro-tection of fundamental rights in this area. To the extent that their standards of protection coincide, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg jurisdictions are complementary. However, the two protection systems remain autonomous, notably as regards the methodology applied to fundamental rights. Ultimately, the EU Member States engage their Convention responsibility for the execution by their domestic courts of any EAWs.
The present contribution analyses the Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU on CETA, which, in a surprisingly uncritical view of conceivable conflicts between the competences of the CETA Investment Tribunal on the one hand and those of the CJEU on the other hand, did not raise any objections. In first reactions, this opinion was welcomed as an extension of the EU's room for manoeuvre in investment protection. The investment court system under CETA, however, is only compatible with EU law to a certain extent, which the Court made clear in the text of the opinion, and the restrictions are likely to confine the leeway for EU external contractual relations. Due to their fundamental importance, these restrictions, derived by the CJEU from the autonomy of the Union legal order form the core subject of this contribution. In what follows, the new emphasis in the CETA opinion on the external autonomy of Union law will be analyzed first (II). Subsequently, the considerations of the CJEU on the delimitation of its competences from those of the CETA Tribunal will be critically examined. The rather superficial analysis of the CJEU in the CETA opinion is in contrast to its approach in earlier decisions as it misjudges problems and therefore only superficially leads to a clear delimitation of competences (III.). An exploration of the last part of the CJEU's autonomy analysis will follow, in which the CJEU tries to respond to the criticism of regulatory chill (IV). Here, by referring to the unhindered operation of the EU institutions in accordance with their constitutional framework, the CJEU identifies the new restrictions for investment protection mechanisms just mentioned, which takes back the previous comprehensive affirmation of jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal in one point and which raises many questions about its concrete significance, consequence, and scope of application.
Die Würdigung des Reformvorschlags, dessen Kern die Direktwahl des Ministerpräsidenten ist, fällt insgesamt positiv aus. Dahin geht auch die überwiegende Meinung im wissenschaftlichen Schrifttum. Ablehnende Äußerungen aus der Praxis beruhen hauptsächlich auf momentanen parteipolitischen Erwägungen und sind deshalb nicht überzubewerten. Die Durchsetzung einer entsprechenden Reform könnte durch Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid erfolgen. Die Bürger wollen in ihrer großen Mehrheit ihre Exekutivspitzen direkt wählen. Das wissen wir aus Umfragen und dem Referendum über die Einfiihrung der Direktwahlen von Bürgermeistern und Landräten in Hessen. Auf diese Weise ließe sich also das sachlich Sinnvolle mit dem massenpsychologisch Wirksamen verbinden und eine grundlegende institutionelle Reform verwirklichen. Gelingt dies nur in einem Land, könnte dies wie ein demokratischer "Urknall" wirken und Reformer auch in anderen Ländern und im Bund ermutigen.