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In the judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the retirement of Polish Supreme Court judges, declaring that the mechanism of arbitrary lowering the retirement age was not compatible with the European Union law. This commentary analyses the latest changes in the Polish judicial system and the CJEU's arguments. The study is focused in the change in European case-law and the development of instruments available to the EU institutions for monitoring judicial independence. The paper discusses also the elements of the judicial independence indicated by CJEU and the rules on the retirement of judges.
The article presents legal (constitutional) aspects of the emergency situation concerning the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The purpose of this article is the general vision of judicial independence in the EU and its defence mechanisms. The article analyses the ways of the protection of this principle, as well as its development and substantial content in the context of the recent CJEU jurisprudence on the status of the judiciary in Poland. The first part of the article explains the techniques (of a political and legal nature) to guarantee judicial independence in the EU. The objective is to demonstrate how the procedure based on the Article 7 TEU, as well as the preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU) and infringement procedures (Article 258 TFEU) increment the enforceability of judicial independence. In the second part the article develops the concept of judicial independence and the detailed guarantees in this field, including rules for judicial appointments, the retirement regime, disciplinary responsibility and remuneration.
This conference speech argues that the judgement of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal K 3/21 can be understood only in the context of the current conflict between the Polish government and the European Union. Moreover, some other details, including how the unconstitutionality of the EU Treaty provisions was formulated, are important. The development of the judicial independence doctrine in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may cause discussion. Nonetheless, the judgement K 3/21 is not an example of constructive debate about the division of the competences in the European legal sphere. It constitutes an example of the abuse of the constitutional identity and it resolves a false problem, as in reality there is no conflict between the norms of the Polish Constitution and the EU law as far as the guarantees of the judicial independence are concerned. Moreover, the judgement K 3/21 was delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal which itself lacks the guarantees of independence, what was confirmed by the European Court of Human
Rights (7.05.2021 Xero Flor, 4907/18).
It has become a truism that the Internet gives a range of private actors, such as social media, substantial power. They are thus able to control the communication processes, hold considerable authority over shaping opinions, and become the arbiters of free speech. That is why legal scholars and policymakers are searching for legal tools that would ensure a fair balance between the conflicting rights of these two groups of private actors (platforms and their users).
The aim of this presentation would be to reconsider the relationship between individuals and online platforms, analyze how horizontal online conflicts may be resolved (giving examples of some national legislation and EU proposal concerning digital services), and answer the question if the discretion of the platforms can be limited in order to protect rights and freedoms. The theoretical framework of the analysis would be the doctrine of the State’s positive obligations, as established in the current European Court of Human Rights case law.
The main argument would be that it is necessary to strengthen the public supervision over Internet platforms, in particular the way they resolve horizontal conflicts. The possibility of limiting their discretion, in order to provide individual protection, does not mean however creating the unlimited right of access to the platform in order to express any opinion or view (freedom of forum).
Electoral disinformation has become one of the most challenging problems for democratic states. All of them are facing the phenomenon of - both online and offline - dissemination of false information during pre-electoral period, which is harmful for individual and collective rights. As a consequence, some European countries adopted special measures, including summary judicial proceedings in order to declare that information or materials used in elec-tioneering are false and to prohibit its further dissemination. There are already three rulings of the ECtHR concerning this expeditious judicial examination provided in the Polish law. In December 2018 France passed complex regulation against manipulation of information that include similar mechanisms. This article, basing on the ECtHR’s case law and some national experiences, attempts to define the minimal European standard for measures targeted at electoral disinformation, especially judicial summary proceeding. It contains the analysis of the notion of electoral disinformation, defines the state’s positive obligations in this sphere, and indicates mayor challenges for the legal framework. The principal argument is that summary judicial proceedings – if adequately designed – cannot be questioned from the Convention standpoint and provide a partial solution to the problem of electoral dis-information.
The lecture explains the emergence of the new European Public Law against the backdrop of a constitutional crisis.